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This Article explores the possible role of the attorney disciplinary process in
discouraging prosecutorial conduct that contributes to false convictions. It
asks what the impact would be, for better or worse, of disciplining prosecutors
for incompetence when they fail to exercise reasonable care to prevent the
conviction of the innocent. The inquiry provides a new vehicle for thinking
about the nature of the disciplinary process, the work of prosecutors, the
challenge of preventing erroneous convictions and, ultimately, the complexities
of prosecutorial regulation.
The Article demonstrates that it would be plausible to interpret the attorney
competence rule as encompassing prosecutorial negligence and identifies
various potential benefits of doing so. But the Article also identifies and
analyzes significant normative and institutional objections that might be
raised. The Article concludes that there are serious problems with employing
the competence rule as proposed and that these problems are inherent in the use
of discipline to regulate prosecutors.
This analysis suggests that the historical under-utilization of discipline in
regulating prosecutors may not result exclusively from insufficient resources
or a lack of will on the part of disciplinary regulators, as some have argued.
The Article’s illustration of the inherent limitations of the disciplinary process
highlights the need for renewed attention to alternative regulatory processes.
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These include civil liability, which currently is foreclosed by prosecutorial
immunity doctrines, and more robust internal regulation.
INTRODUCTION
A civil rights case recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court commenced
when Thomas Lee Goldstein sued the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s
Office for conduct that led to Goldstein’s wrongful incarceration.1 Goldstein
was convicted of murder based on a jailhouse informant’s testimony that
Goldstein had confessed.2 At trial, the informant concealed that he had
previously served as a government witness in exchange for a series of reduced
sentences, a fact which Goldstein learned only decades later.3 Upon his
exoneration and release, Goldstein found himself unable to sue the trial
prosecutor for failing to disclose the exculpatory information or correct the
informant’s false testimony, because prosecutors are immune from civil
liability for actions taken in their “prosecutorial role.”4 Goldstein’s civil
case therefore maintained that senior prosecutors were negligent in performing
an administrative function – training trial prosecutors to share information about
informants.5 The Supreme Court rejected Goldstein’s attempt to avoid absolute
prosecutorial immunity, and proving that the supervisors were negligent would
have been difficult even if the Supreme Court had allowed the case to proceed on
the theory that supervisory lapses are actionable.
The Goldstein case highlights the regulatory vacuum created when the
Supreme Court implemented prosecutorial immunity thirty-three years ago.6
With the advent of DNA evidence and the realization that criminal defendants
are erroneously convicted more frequently than previously believed,7 courts
and commentators have been struggling to identify alternative mechanisms for
holding prosecutors to their theoretical obligation to see “that justice shall be

1

Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, No. 07-854 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2009).
Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d sub
nom. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, No. 07-854 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2009).
3 Id.
4 See id. at 1173-75 (discussing the level of immunity afforded prosecutors in § 1983
actions).
5
The Court of Appeals found in Goldstein’s favor, concluding that prosecutors have
only qualified immunity for administrative acts. Id. at 1175; cf. Walker v. City of New
York, 974 F.2d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 1992) (basing liability on the District Attorney office’s
failure to train and supervise individual prosecutors “to disclose exculpatory evidence and to
avoid the use of perjured evidence”).
6 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (applying the absolute immunity
prosecutors enjoyed from civil actions at common law to § 1983 actions).
7 See generally Innocence Project – Know the Cases, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know
(last visited Nov. 24, 2008) (“There have been 225 post-conviction DNA exonerations in
United States history. These stories are becoming more familiar as more innocent people
gain their freedom through postconviction testing.”).
2
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done.”8 Even if Goldstein had prevailed in the Supreme Court, civil litigation
would serve only a marginal role in regulating misconduct, because
prosecutors exercising “prosecutorial” functions would remain invulnerable to
suit.
This Article explores the feasibility of using the attorney disciplinary
process to fill the vacuum.9 The disciplinary process is a natural place to look
because, in justifying immunity, the Supreme Court relied on the existence of
professional regulation as an alternative remedy for prosecutorial
misconduct.10 Unfortunately, legal ethics codes expressly address only a
narrow range of prosecutorial behavior, so discipline has not proven to be an
effective deterrent.11
The Article therefore conducts a thought experiment. Most legal ethics
codes include provisions based on Rule 1.1 of the American Bar Association’s
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”), which requires all
lawyers to “provide competent representation.”12 The Article explores the

8

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
Numerous commentators have disapproved of prosecutorial immunity and have urged
its reversal or substitute remedies for civil liability. E.g., Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering
Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53, 59 (arguing “that absolute
prosecutorial immunity should be abandoned and replaced in all circumstances by qualified
immunity”); Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and Stare Decisis: The Present
Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity and an End to Its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L. REV.
1135, 1138 (1996) (“Although prosecutors need some protection from suit, absolute
immunity is too much.”); Lesley E. Williams, Note, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 3441, 3464-80 (1999) (discussing the problems with the current system of
prosecutorial discipline, recommending enhanced enforcement of ethical obligations, and
arguing for limiting prosecutorial immunity to qualified immunity).
10 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429.
11 See, e.g., Edward M. Genson & Marc W. Martin, The Epidemic of Prosecutorial
Courtroom Misconduct in Illinois: Is It Time to Start Prosecuting the Prosecutors?, 19 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 39, 47 (1987) (“Disciplinary sanctions are rarely imposed against prosecutors.”);
Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987) (“[D]isciplinary charges have been brought
infrequently and meaningful sanctions [have been] rarely applied.”); Kenneth Rosenthal,
Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging
Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 889 (1998) (“[T]here is a notable absence of
disciplinary sanctions against prosecutors, even in the most egregious cases.”); Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8
D.C. L. REV. 275, 277 (2004) [hereinafter Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions] (“[T]he
disciplinary consequence [of prosecutorial misconduct] is often nil.”); Fred C. Zacharias,
The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 756-62, 774 (2001)
[hereinafter Zacharias, Professional Discipline] (documenting the infrequency of discipline
against prosecutors and identifying explanations).
12 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2008) (“A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
9
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possibility of enforcing the general competence standard against prosecutors
who fail to exercise reasonable care to prevent false convictions.13 The inquiry
provides a new vehicle for thinking about the nature of the disciplinary
process, the work of prosecutors, the challenge of preventing faulty results,
and ultimately, the complexities of prosecutorial regulation.
The Article begins in Part I by examining when prosecutors are to blame for
false convictions. Part II illustrates that little of this conduct is regulated by
specific professional rules. Existing ethics provisions, for the most part,
simply reinforce or implement constitutional mandates governing the trial
process.
Part III considers the option of employing the competence rule to discipline
prosecutors who engage in behavior that risks faulty convictions. It sets forth the
general contours of the proposed disciplinary remedy and identifies its
potential benefits.
Parts IV, V, and VI explore objections that prosecutors or others might raise
against the proposed enforcement of the competence rule. Part IV identifies
and analyzes possible objections to interpreting rules like Model Rule 1.1 as
encompassing prosecutorial behavior or as requiring defendant-protective
behavior. Part V addresses normative objections to enforcing a competence
rule vigorously, including the possibility that more harm than good would result.
The analysis illustrates the complexity of regulating prosecutorial conduct
through a general standard such as competence, but concludes that the proposed
approach nevertheless is plausible. Finally, Part VI addresses institutional
concerns – most notably, whether professional discipline is the best approach
to enforcing prosecutorial competence.
The Article identifies reasons to be skeptical of the conventional confidence,
expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court and others, in the efficacy of
prosecutorial discipline. It suggests that the current failure of the disciplinary
regime may not simply be a matter of favoritism toward prosecutors, laxity on
the part of disciplinary authorities, or inadequate resources. Rather, disciplinary
regulators’ historic deference to prosecutors’ offices may reflect legitimate policy
and political considerations that militate against aggressive disciplinary
oversight. The Article’s insights, in turn, raise new questions about the
legitimacy of prosecutorial immunity and highlight the need to enhance
prosecutorial self-regulation.
I.

PROSECUTORS’ RESPONSIBILITY FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

American law seeks to prevent erroneous criminal convictions principally
through procedures designed to ensure that the risk of trial error falls on the

13

The Article’s analysis probably applies equally to prosecutors’ role in preventing
improper incarceration and other forms of punishment. To streamline the thought
experiment, however, the Article confines itself to prosecutors’ participation in
convicting the innocent.
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side of acquittals rather than guilty verdicts.14 Improvements in genetic testing
and media reports of defendants exonerated through its use, however, have
heightened public awareness that false convictions nonetheless result.15 This
has led to renewed attention to the causes of faulty outcomes, including
prosecutors’ acts and omissions.16
Prosecutors rarely deserve exclusive or primary blame for the conviction of
innocent defendants.17 Inaccurate testimony accounts for many of the cases in
which innocent individuals are found guilty: witnesses may falsify the facts;18

14

The procedural protections include the right to counsel, evidentiary safeguards, and the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 456
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]rongful conviction is avoided by establishing, at the trial
level, lines of procedural legality that leave ample margins of safety . . . .”); cf. Andrew D.
Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1123, 1123 (2005) (“[D]espite all the procedural protections built into the criminal
system, juries and judges are sometimes convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a fact that
is false.”).
15 See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND
HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT, at xiii-xxi (2003) (discussing wrongful convictions and their
causes); see also United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005)
(describing how DNA testing has changed the criminal justice system); Keith A. Findley,
Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study Wrongful
Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 336 (2002) (observing that DNA testing has resulted
in the exoneration of over one hundred defendants); Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on
Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 237-40 (observing that the irrefutable nature of DNA
evidence has resulted in “[p]rint, electronic media, movies, and television shows all [vying]
to portray the latest real or fictionalized saga of an innocent person locked up for years”); cf.
Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit
the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1359 (1997) (“[P]rocedural protections . . . have
not succeeded in minimizing false convictions to the extent practicable.”).
16 See generally CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERRORS: INVESTIGATING AMERICA’S
LOCAL PROSECUTORS (2003) (tracking prosecutorial misconduct nationally); Fredric N.
Tulsky, Tainted Trial Series Part Two: Prosecutors over the Line, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS,
Jan.
23,
2006,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.mercurynews.com/taintedtrials/ci_5127908
(describing
prosecutorial
misconduct as part of a three-year study of wrongful convictions).
17
See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L REV 55, 122 (2008)
(finding that the primary evidence supporting false convictions were “eyewitness
identification evidence, forensic evidence, informant testimony, and confessions”); Jeff Peabody,
Prosecutorial Liability for Wrongful Convictions 3-7 (May 8, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130250) (discussing various causes of
false convictions).
18 See, e.g., Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“[E]ach contract for testimony is fraught with the real peril that the proffered testimony will
. . . [be] factually contrived . . . to induce concessions from the government.”); Ruff v.
Runyon, 258 F.3d 498, 499 (6th Cir. 2001) (adjudicating a civil action resulting from false
informant testimony presented to a grand jury); cf. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation With
Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L.
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eye-witnesses misidentify defendants;19 and defendants sometimes cannot
adequately explain prior false confessions.20 In other cases, erroneous
convictions result because police falsify evidence21 or fail to convey
exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor,22 defense lawyers lapse,23 judges act
partially or apply law negligently,24 or juries reach incorrect conclusions based
on prejudice, false inferences, inadequacies in the evidence, or simply poor
judgment.25
REV. 917, 931 (1999) [hereinafter Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors]
(discussing whether prosecutors are able to confidently extract truthful testimony from
cooperating witnesses).
19 The Supreme Court has “recognized the inherently suspect qualities of eyewitness
identification evidence.” Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 350 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); accord United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“The vagaries of
eyewitness identification are well-known . . . .”).
20 See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the PostDNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 944-45, 970-71 (2004) (analyzing 125 cases of
“interrogation-induced false confessions” and emphasizing the special vulnerability of
children and the mentally retarded); Garrett, supra note 17, at 74 (finding that defendants
had confessed in 9 of 200 cases in which false convictions were established); see also False
Accusations Scar Boys, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005, at A18 (describing the extraction of a
false murder confession from two young boys). Defendants who regret their confessions
may not dare take the stand to recant because of a fear being impeached with prior
convictions or losing a benefit the confession has procured. See John H. Blume, The
Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record – Lessons from the Wrongfully
Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 479 (2008) (“[D]emonstrably innocent defendants
do not testify in their own defense at substantially [higher] rates than criminal defendants in
general.”).
21 E.g., Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 2004) (describing a police cover-up
that resulted in the conviction of three innocent men); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279,
1283 (10th Cir. 2004) (discussing an investigation of a forensic chemist that found that five
of eight investigations “involved contrived and erroneous statements . . . beyond the limits
of forensic science”); Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 943 (5th Cir. 2003) (describing
an arson conviction based on recordings altered to sound like a confession).
22 E.g., Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 749 (7th Cir. 2001) (describing an incident
where the police officers did not tell prosecutors that the defendant’s fingerprints did not
match those found at the crime scene).
23 See CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ON FUNDING OF DEFENSE SERVICES IN CALIFORNIA 4 (2008) (reporting a ten-year study
which found that, of 121 cases in which California’s appellate courts identified ineffective
assistance of counsel, 104 convictions were reversed).
24 False convictions often result because judicial lapses are affirmed as “harmless error.”
E.g., Fry v. Pliler, 127 S. Ct. 2321, 2324, 2327-28 (2007) (affirming a conviction despite the
trial judge’s erroneous exclusion of a defense witness); United States v. Record, 873 F.2d
1363, 1365-66, 1370-71 (10th Cir. 1989) (affirming a criminal conviction while finding that
the trial court acted improperly); United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1289 (5th Cir.
1979) (excusing a trial judge’s conduct in falling asleep during defense counsel’s opening).
25 See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & Barbara A. Mellers, Do Juries Meet Our Expectations?, 26
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 625, 637 (2002) (concluding that juries’ “error rates are sizable”);
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Other faulty convictions involve defendants who plead guilty.26 Innocent
criminal defendants voluntarily accept punishment for the same sorts of
reasons that civil litigants settle even when they deserve to prevail at trial.27
Some counter-factual pleas simply hedge the risk of trial error – i.e., the
possibility of conviction despite the defendant’s innocence.28 Other false pleas
result from pressures or inducements to plead guilty.29 In cases involving
potential sanctions that are relatively minor, defendants often have strong
incentives to plead guilty though confident they would ultimately be
acquitted.30
Although prosecutors are not always the cause of wrongful convictions, they
invariably play some role in producing them. Prosecutors make the initial
Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 305, 326 (2007) (estimating that jury verdicts are inaccurate in at least thirteen
percent of cases).
26 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932-34 (1983)
(discussing flaws of the plea bargaining system); John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All
Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 88, 96 (1977) (questioning whether guilty pleas are confined to guilty defendants);
Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure:
The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1382-84 (2003)
(“[O]ur system . . . perversely makes it too easy for [innocent defendants] to plead guilty by
allowing Alford and nolo contendere pleas.”); Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of
Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1395
(2000) (“Available data confirms the common sense proposition that not all guilty pleas are
accurate . . . .”).
27 See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1130 (2008);
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2548, 2549 (2004).
28 See Ruff v. Runyon, 258 F.3d 498, 499-500 (6th Cir. 2001) (resolving a civil suit by
plaintiffs who, in a prior criminal proceeding, though believing themselves innocent,
pleaded guilty to reduced charges after being confronted with fabricated informant
testimony); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289, 308-09 (1983) (modeling plea bargaining as an entirely market-based system in
which each side responds to the risks); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply:
Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011, 2012
(1992) (“[I]f the trial process is flawed – if trials sometimes convict innocent defendants –
bargaining will not fix the mistakes.”).
29 Cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1995-98
(1992) (suggesting a need to minimize pleas involving innocent defendants).
30 See, e.g., MALCOM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 185-89, 195-96
(1979) (analyzing the benefits that plea bargaining offers defendants and why the criminal
justice system favors it); Bowers, supra note 27, at 1119 (“On balance, plea bargaining is a
categorical good for many defendants, particularly in low-stakes cases.”). For example, a
defendant is likely to accept probation when otherwise he would be detained while awaiting
trial. Other defendants may accept pleas simply to avoid missing work in order to attend
court.
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decision to bring charges. Thereafter, prosecutors offer favorable plea
bargains that can contribute to innocent defendants’ decisions to plead guilty.
Before trial, the prosecutor prepares the witnesses, some of whom may testify
inaccurately. In court, a prosecutor may make a presentation based on
admissible but misleading evidence or ask the jury to draw inferences that
prove to be incorrect. It does not follow that the prosecutor’s conduct in
these scenarios is blameworthy; legitimate adversarial behavior can
contribute to a wrongful conviction simply because it exploits defects for
which others are primarily responsible.31
There is a range of conduct that prosecutors may undertake in good faith but
nevertheless creates a serious danger of producing false convictions. For
example, prosecutors often offer benefits, such as leniency or immunity from
prosecution, to accomplices and informants. The inducements alone can
cause a witness to testify falsely. Prosecutors’ interviewing techniques may
further encourage false testimony by signaling what a witness must say to obtain
the offered benefits. Although both criminal statutes and professional codes
forbid prosecutors to intentionally elicit false testimony,32 they are otherwise
silent with respect to prosecutors’ methods of preparing witnesses. One
should not infer, however, that techniques which pose an unreasonable risk of
eliciting perjury are legitimate. There simply is no accepted standard
delineating prosecutors’ obligations to evaluate the bona fides of unreliable
evidence.
Similarly, the gate-keeping functions of prosecutors traditionally have been
left almost entirely to prosecutorial discretion. With respect to screening, for
instance, the professional codes typically forbid prosecutors to bring charges in
the absence of probable cause but leave unresolved how prosecutors should act
once that minimal threshold is satisfied.33 Prosecutors have been known to file
prosecutions when there is no better than a fifty percent likelihood that the
defendant is guilty, as in the situation in which a prosecutor charges two
individuals with the same act, knowing that both cannot be guilty.34 How
prosecutors should exercise discretion in such cases, however, remains a
31

A prosecutor may, for example, secure a faulty conviction based on testimony that he
had no reason to believe was false.
32 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2008).
33 See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.9(b)(i) (1993) (authorizing
prosecutors to decline prosecution based on their “reasonable doubt the accused is . . .
guilty”); cf. infra text accompanying note 182.
34 See Michael Q. English, A Prosecutor’s Use of Inconsistent Factual Theories of a
Crime in Successive Trials: Zealous Advocacy or a Due Process Violation?, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 525, 525-28 (1999) (analyzing prosecutors’ use of inconsistent factual theories against
multiple defendants for individual crimes); Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial
Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight,
89 CAL L. REV. 1423, 1423 (2001) (arguing that prosecutors “should be prohibited from
exploiting inconsistent positions in separate proceedings” because it would violate Due
Process rights of defendants).
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matter of debate; given the fallibility of the trial process, one might plausibly
argue that it is unreasonable to proceed in cases in which the risk of a false
conviction is significant.
The legal and professional standards also fail to address prosecutors’
obligations to correct deficiencies in the trial process. Prosecutors sometimes
have incentives to remedy errors in order to avoid appellate reversals, but this
will not always be true. It is unclear whether and when prosecutors should be
held accountable for contributing to wrongful convictions by allowing defense
attorneys to serve ineffectively,35 judges to act partially or incompetently,36 or
juries to operate in ways inconsistent with the adversary system’s ideals.37
II.

THE STATUS QUO

Although the Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]t is as much [the
prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one,”38 existing law does not effectively distinguish blameless conduct from
unreasonable conduct likely to produce a faulty outcome. For the most part,
constitutional and professional standards identify only intentional or obvious
improprieties, such as violating discovery obligations,39 intentional misconduct
in presenting evidence40 and arguments,41 and knowingly contributing to
witness perjury or violating criminal statutes applicable to all attorneys.42

35 See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 70 (1991) [hereinafter Zacharias, Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?] (arguing that a prosecutor’s duty to “serve justice” within an
adversarial system requires a commitment to the adequate functioning of that system and
sometimes may require the prosecutor to remedy inadequate defense representation).
36 See id. at 85-88 (arguing that prosecutors have some duty to respond to judicial bias at
the trial stage); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(b) (2008) (“A lawyer who
knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct . . .
shall inform the appropriate authority.”).
37 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pierce, 303 A.2d 209, 214 (Pa. 1973) (holding that
prosecutors must avoid unduly prejudicial publicity in order to preserve citizens’ rights to
fair trials by impartial juries); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 295 A.2d 303, 307 (Pa. 1972)
(Roberts, J., concurring) (arguing that the prosecutor was required to disclose a juror’s
relationship to the victim).
38 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
39 Prosecutors must produce exculpatory evidence and comply with other procedural,
statutory, and constitutional disclosure requirements. See, e.g., FED R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)
(establishing government disclosure obligations); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 85-86
(1963) (requiring the disclosure of exculpatory evidence).
40 See, e.g., People v. Russ, 589 N.E.2d 375, 378-79 (N.Y. 1992) (reversing a conviction
because the prosecutor intentionally called a witness and revealed recanted testimony on the
pretext of attacking the witness’s credibility).
41 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985) (reversing a death
sentence because of the prosecutor’s misstatements to the jury); Griffin v. California, 380
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As tort law has developed, prosecutors who fail to exercise reasonable care
in performing their duties are immune from lawsuits brought by injured
persons.43 This immunity eliminates civil liability as a mechanism for
regulating prosecutorial conduct. It also impedes the development of
alternative means of regulating prosecutors, because it encourages wrongfully
convicted defendants to shift blame from prosecutors to other state actors who
are potentially subject to liability.44 Prosecutors’ participation in faulty
convictions therefore is less likely to be exposed.45
Prosecutorial immunity places an emphasis on self-regulation by
prosecutors and their offices and, in theory, shifts the burden of external
regulation to the disciplinary process. In the seminal decision establishing
prosecutorial immunity, Imbler v. Pachtman, the U.S. Supreme Court assumed
that attorney discipline would play a significant role in deterring prosecutorial
misconduct.46 The Court observed that “a prosecutor stands perhaps unique,
among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in
his amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers.”47
Despite the Supreme Court’s expectations, professional discipline has had
little practical effect in constraining prosecutorial behavior that risks faulty
U.S. 609, 613-15 (1965) (reversing a conviction because of a prosecutor’s remark to the jury
about the defendant’s failure to testify); Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by
Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629, 644-77 (1972) (analyzing the remedies
for prosecutorial misconduct in summations).
42 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1518 (2000) (prohibiting obstruction of justice); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 141 (West 1999) (establishing that anyone who tampers with evidence is
guilty of a misdemeanor).
43 Prosecutors have absolute immunity for work performed in the trial setting and
qualified immunity for investigative and administrative activities. See, e.g., Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 271 (1993). Other state actors are potentially liable for
procuring wrongful convictions. See, e.g., Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 304 (7th
Cir. 2003) (finding police liable under a federal civil rights law for procuring false
testimony that resulted in an erroneous murder conviction).
44 Because of prosecutorial immunity, where a prosecutor and police share responsibility
for a wrongful conviction, the civil plaintiff might minimize the prosecutor’s participation to
avoid the defense that the prosecutor, not the police, was to blame. See, e.g., Jones v. City
of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming a civil judgment against the police
and rejecting the defense that the plaintiff’s injury arose from the prosecutors’ wrongful
decision to prosecute).
45 James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L REV. 2030, 2121-29
(2000) (discussing reasons why prosecutors, and sometimes police officers, avoid public
opprobrium for misconduct in procuring death sentences); cf. Peabody, supra note 17, at 18
(providing an economic model suggesting that, in the absence of prosecutorial liability for
wrongful convictions, “prosecutors will tend to over-prosecute generally, and are more
likely than not to pursue a conviction in ‘close cases,’ where there is a sizeable chance that
the prosecutor will fail to convict the proper individual”)
46 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976).
47 Id.
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convictions.48 Durham, North Carolina District Attorney Mike Nifong’s
disbarment in June 2007 was an exceptional instance in which disciplinary
regulators imposed meaningful sanctions, but it involved the unusual situation
in which a prosecutor intentionally, and for self-serving reasons, violated
explicit ethics requirements.49 Nifong’s disbarment contrasted sharply with
the North Carolina authorities’ failure to sanction two prosecutors for conduct
resulting in the murder conviction of Alan Gell, who spent nine years in prison
after the prosecutors withheld proof that Gell was incarcerated while the
murder was committed.50 The disciplinary committee merely reprimanded Gell’s
prosecutors, explaining that “there was ‘no clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that [the prosecutors’] conduct was intentional.’”51 What distinguished
Nifong from Gell’s prosecutors was not the seriousness of the harm he caused; the
Duke students Nifong targeted, unlike Gell, remained free throughout the
proceedings. Rather, the difference was in Nifong’s perceived culpability – his
reasons for engaging in the conduct that risked a false conviction.
In general, only a few disciplinary rules addressing prosecutors’ work go
beyond established constitutional law.52 These are mainly procedural rules,
including provisions regulating interference with defendants’ constitutional
rights, the subpoenaing of attorneys, and extrajudicial speech.53 The notable
exception is a 2008 addition to the Model Rules which implements postconviction duties of disclosure, investigation, and rectification upon learning

48

See sources cited supra note 11.
Nifong’s acts in the Duke lacrosse case included making false statements, withholding
exculpatory evidence, and misusing the media in a way that might have led to the conviction
of young men now universally regarded as innocent. Amended Findings of Facts,
Conclusions of Law and Order of Discipline at 22-24, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06
DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007); Robert P.
Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A Fundamental
Failure to “Do Justice,” 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1346, 1348, 1358 (2007) [hereinafter
Mosteller, Duke Lacrosse Case]. Other exceptional cases in which sanctions have been
imposed on prosecutors for professional misconduct include In re Zawada, 92 P.3d 862, 862
(Ariz. 2004) (suspending a prosecutor for conducting an improper cross-examination), and
In re Peasley, 90 P.3d 764, 764 (Ariz. 2004) (disbarring a prosecutor for intentionally
introducing false testimony).
50 Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of
Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV.
257, 264-69 (2008) [hereinafter Mosteller, Disbarment of Nifong].
51 Id. at 270 (quoting Order of Discipline at 3, N.C. State Bar v. Hoke, No. 04 DHC 15
(Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar Dec. 2, 2004) (on file with author)).
52 See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1587
[hereinafter Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual] (discussing the provisions of Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 3.8).
53 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c), (e), (f) (2008). But see, e.g.,
id. R. 3.8(d) (requiring disclosure of all evidence “that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused”).
49
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new evidence that suggests an innocent person has been convicted.54 The new
provision has not been accompanied by parallel prohibitions focusing on
prosecutorial conduct that may lead to a false conviction at the trial or pre-trial
stages.
To the extent that general ethical principles have the potential to constrain a
broad range of unreasonable prosecutorial behavior, disciplinary agencies have
never tapped into that potential. Many ethics codes forbid “conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice,”55 but no jurisdiction has interpreted
this prohibition with an eye toward developing prosecutorial standards.
Language in the codes exhorting prosecutors to serve justice has been similarly
ignored, largely because of the codes’ failure to define the meaning of
“justice.”56 The codes typically do not reflect other possible sources of
restraint identified in the professional responsibility literature, such as the
concept of “prosecutorial neutrality.”57
The bottom line is that disciplinary agencies have not interpreted the
existing rules expansively. Prosecutorial discipline has been rare.58 As a
consequence, the disciplinary process does not currently play a significant role in
influencing prosecutorial behavior.
III. THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF THE COMPETENCE RULE IN REGULATING
PROSECUTORS’ CONTRIBUTION TO WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
Some commentators are skeptical that disciplinary regulation can constrain
prosecutorial behavior attributable to overzealousness or negligence. These
commentators instead advocate for more demanding legal rules governing
specific prosecutorial activity, including discovery, interrogating witnesses, and
Other
overseeing accomplice testimony and eyewitness identifications.59
commentators, however, take the view that the disciplinary process should play
a more robust role in constraining prosecutorial misconduct, arguing that
existing ethics rules should be enforced more vigorously or their scope

54 Id. R. 3.8(g)-(h). For a discussion of prosecutors’ post-conviction obligations, see
generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Convictions,
58 VAND. L. REV. 171 (2005).
55 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d).
56 See Zacharias, Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, supra note 35, at 46-53, 69-70
(discussing the possible meaning of “justice” in the codes).
57 Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 838,
901 [hereinafter Green & Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality] (discussing ethics codes’
failure to address prosecutorial neutrality and possible reasons why drafters have failed to
do so).
58 See sources cited supra note 11.
59 E.g., Mosteller, Duke Lacrosse Case, supra note 49, at 1408 (advocating “concrete,
enforceable rules” on eyewitness identification); Mosteller, Disbarment of Nifong, supra
note 50, at 318 (advocating open-file discovery).
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expanded.60 Imbler’s reliance on prosecutors’ “amenability to professional
discipline”61 suggests that it may be fair to impose on prosecutors at least some
enforceable disciplinary obligation to take defendants’ innocence seriously62 –
an obligation the generalized concept of “seeking justice” assumes but does not
spell out in a meaningful way.63
The following Sections of this Article explore one way in which disciplinary
agencies might enhance their oversight in this regard; namely, interpreting the
professional competence rule as including the obligation to exercise reasonable
care to avoid false convictions. As background, Section A contrasts
disciplinary regulators’ use of the competence requirement against private
attorneys, including criminal defense lawyers, with the regulators’ historical
indifference to instances of prosecutorial incompetence. Section B then
introduces the possibility of expanding the competence rule’s enforcement.
The remaining sections flesh out the thought experiment. Section C describes
the potential benefits of enhanced enforcement of the rule. Section D
illustrates why this approach might be preferable to other options for
enhancing prosecutorial discipline.
A.

Disciplinary Authorities’ Unresponsiveness to Prosecutorial Negligence

Most states have adopted professional code provisions that, like Model Rule
1.1, require all lawyers to provide “competent representation to a client.”64
These provisions have been enforced selectively against private attorneys.
Recognizing lawyers’ human fallibility and seeking to conserve resources,
disciplinary authorities typically reserve discipline for incompetence that is

60

E.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 141, 161 (2007) (advocating stricter oversight of prosecutors by disciplinary
authorities and “[a] separate code of prosecutorial conduct”); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 761 (1986) (commenting on a “lack of will on the part of
disciplinary agencies”); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing
Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851,
901 (1995) (“Infusing the professional disciplinary bodies with more money and resources
to identify and sanction prosecutorial misconduct is one way to remedy the inadequate
scrutiny that prosecutors currently receive.”).
61
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976).
62 See United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 761 (8th Cir. 2006) (asserting that it is
“part of [prosecutors’] professional responsibility to avoid inculpating the innocent”).
63 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 607, 634 (1999) [hereinafter Green, Why “Seek Justice”?] (maintaining that doing
justice includes pursuing objectives implicit in the constitutional and statutory law including
avoiding convicting the innocent, affording defendants a fair and lawful process, treating
wrongdoers with proportionality, and treating similarly situated individuals roughly the
same); Zacharias, Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, supra note 35, at 46 (discussing the ethics
codes’ failure to define the meaning of justice).
64 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2008).
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egregious or places future clients at risk.65 They rely on civil liability as an
alternative mechanism for deterring ordinary lawyer negligence.66
Nevertheless, by preserving the possibility of sanction for incompetence,
occasional enforcement of the competence rule encourages care on the part of
some private attorneys who might otherwise approach clients’ matters
cavalierly.67
Disciplinary authorities have been especially hesitant to enforce the
competence rule in cases involving criminal defense lawyers, for a variety of
reasons.68 Even so, criminal defenders face a realistic risk of discipline for
incompetence, particularly when defense negligence potentially leads to an
erroneous conviction. For example, in In re Wolfram, a criminal defense
lawyer was sanctioned for inadequately investigating and preparing his client’s
case.69 The reviewing court identified a host of specific tasks the lawyer had
failed to perform: interviewing prosecution witnesses and other prospective
witnesses, procuring independent expert witnesses, reading the grand jury
transcript, examining physical evidence, consulting with the client on whether
to submit lesser included offenses to the jury, challenging prospective jurors,
and objecting to expert testimony offered on the ultimate issue of guilt.70
Taken together, the omissions made the representation, in the words of
successor counsel, “wretched beyond all belief” – an assessment the court
quoted with evident agreement.71 Although there was no specific legal
obligation to do any of the tasks the court identified, the competence rule
allowed the disciplinary authorities to evaluate the quality of the lawyer’s acts
collectively.

65 See WOLFRAM, supra note 60, at 191 (“[O]nly relatively blatant cases of incompetence
are selected for disciplinary prosecution . . . .”).
66 See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 803
(1992) (observing the expansion of civil malpractice liability).
67 See Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Witt, No. CV010810765, 2002 WL 31124756, at
*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2002) (suspending a recidivist lawyer for three months for
incompetence and lack of diligence).
68 Court-appointed lawyers’ lapses may be attributable to the pressures of inadequate
office staffing or inadequate state funding rather than the lawyers’ incompetence. The Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel already provides a supplemental remedy
for criminal defendants harmed by their counsel’s negligence. Constitutional decisions also
provide an alternative vehicle through which courts can analyze and identify incompetent
representation. See Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal
Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1185-90 (2003) (discussing constitutional case
law’s effect on defense counsel behavior).
69 In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 103 (Ariz. 1993) (justifying a sanction based on the
lawyer’s “lack of competence and diligence, and his failure to properly communicate with
his client”).
70 Id. at 96.
71 Id. at 96-97.
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In theory, prosecutors are subject to the same obligation to “provide
competent representation to a client.”72 Their “client” is the state (or another
sovereign entity), not the victim, defendant, or any individual.73 But
representing the state may include functions that, when performed correctly,
safeguard the interests of individuals. The Comment to Model Rule 3.8, which
addresses the “Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,” specifically references
the competence rule as a potential source of prosecutorial obligations.74
As a practical matter, disciplinary regulators have not implemented rules
like Model Rule 1.1 against prosecutors. Prosecutorial neglect has been
regulated almost exclusively through internal administrative sanctions or
informally by courts.75 The following Sections develop the rationale for giving
the competence rule a more significant role in prosecutorial discipline.

72

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2008). Although not all professional rules
are germane to prosecutors’ work, prosecutors are subject to ethics requirements, including
rules governing the attorney-client relationship, relationships with the court and third
parties, and rules addressing conduct in which the prosecutors do engage. See Fred C.
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207,
216-18 (2000) (discussing prosecutors’ ethics obligations after the Ethical Standards for
Federal Prosecutors Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2000)).
73 Cf. John Jackson, The Ethical Implications of the Enhanced Role of the Public
Prosecutor, 9 LEGAL ETHICS 35, 48 (2006) (arguing that prosecutors’ “task is similar to that
of judges”).
74 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2008) (“Competent representation of
the sovereignty may require a prosecutor to undertake some procedural and remedial
measures as a matter of obligation.”).
75 Non-performing prosecutors are subject to chastisement by judges and supervisors and
may be denied promotions or, in extreme cases, discharged. See Bruce A. Green, Policing
Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 69, 71, 83-87 (1995) [hereinafter Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors]
(discussing informal judicial disciplinary mechanisms and the disciplinary powers of district
court disciplinary committees).
Federal prosecutors face the possibility of formal sanctions imposed by the Justice
Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”). The nature of OPR’s oversight,
however, is uncertain. The first report of a disciplinary investigation published by OPR
found that a prosecutor had negligently, but not intentionally, withheld exculpatory material.
Id. at 86-87 (discussing OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, PUBLIC REPORT ON
INVESTIGATION OF MISCONDUCT ALLEGATIONS IN UNITED STATES V. ISGRO (1994)). From
1993 to 1999, OPR publicly disclosed some of its activities, issuing seventeen reports. See
Williams, supra note 9, at 3475. Previous to that period and subsequently under the Bush
Administration, OPR’s investigative reports were not disclosed, and only summary information
was provided in OPR’s annual reports. This made it impossible to know the circumstances under
which, and in what manner, the Justice Department sanctions federal prosecutors for
incompetence.
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Initiating the Thought Experiment: Enforcing a Prosecutor’s Duty to
Avoid Wrongful Convictions

Assuming prosecutors are responsible for representing their clients
competently, what is the scope of that duty? At root, competent work requires
the performance of basic job functions, including carefully investigating and
presenting matters to the grand jury. It also entails carrying out legally
required tasks, such as filing briefs or disclosing information in accordance
with discovery rules. At a minimum, prosecutors must fulfill the state’s core
objectives and accomplish core tasks essential to successful prosecutions,
including screening cases diligently, interviewing and preparing key witnesses,
preparing for trial, and performing adequately in court. This Article has
posited that the competence requirement can also be interpreted to include the
exercise of reasonable care to avoid convicting the innocent, an obligation that
has both negative and affirmative components: avoiding unreasonable conduct that
tends to produce wrongful convictions and undertaking conduct reasonably
necessary to prevent wrongful convictions.
Under this conception, prosecutorial acts and omissions, cumulatively, can
create an unreasonable likelihood of false convictions even when (as in
Wolfram) no single act or omission itself would violate the competence rule.76
Suppose, for example, that a prosecutor in a corporate fraud case comes to
believe that an unindicted employee was a co-conspirator. In pursuing the
employee, the prosecutor might engage in the following acts, none of which
alone would be grounds for discipline: (1) securing an accomplice’s
cooperation by offering immunity; (2) falsely informing the accomplice that
the evidence overwhelmingly suggests the employee attended a meeting where
the fraud was discussed; (3) reminding the accomplice that the immunity
agreement requires him to cooperate fully; (4) obtaining the accomplice’s
testimony that the employee attended the meeting, even though the
accomplice’s lawyer expresses doubts about the accomplice’s credibility on
this point; (5) failing to seek evidence that would contradict the account; (6)
ignoring the absence of evidence corroborating the accomplice’s account; (7)
failing to disclose the expression of doubt by the accomplice’s attorney, on the
theory that it was not evidence and was made in the course of plea
negotiations; and (8) presenting the accomplice’s testimony in evidence at the
employee’s trial. In context, the prosecutor’s overall conduct arguably creates
an unreasonable risk of obtaining a wrongful conviction.
For purposes of this Article’s thought experiment, let us assume (as
generally is the case in disciplinary matters) that regulators may enforce the
competence rule without establishing that the prosecutor’s acts caused actual
harm.
Disciplinary enforcement would be intended to encourage
76

In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 100 (Ariz. 1993) (“We note that some of Respondent’s
acts and omissions, if viewed independently of one another, are not objectionable and may
be explained by legitimate lawyering and trial strategy. Nevertheless, an examination of
Respondent’s conduct, in the aggregate, tells a much different story.”).
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prosecutors to evaluate and self-regulate their conduct prospectively, at a
time when they can still avoid injuries to their client or third persons to whom
they owe a duty. In effect, the competence rule would require prosecutors
initially – and disciplinary agencies and reviewing courts ultimately – to consider
whether the totality of the prosecutorial conduct creates an unreasonable risk of
producing a false conviction.
Two practical impediments to enforcing the competence rule in this way
should be noted at the outset. The first involves a problem of proof.
Prosecutions are not transparent. Only a small amount of prosecutors’ work
takes place in court. Even when a prosecutor’s conduct is on the record, its
propriety may depend on related off-the-record conduct. Disciplinary agencies
may have difficulty obtaining evidence of a prosecutor’s out-of-court misconduct or
behavior that would be necessary to evaluate the prosecutor’s in-court
activities.77
The second impediment to enforcing rules like Model Rule 1.1 is that
disciplinary agencies have limited resources. Proving prosecutors’ conduct
and knowledge can be labor-intensive, because prosecution offices tend to resist
any suggestion that they have acted improperly.78 This problem is exacerbated
by the vagueness of the competence standard; accused prosecutors often will
be able to challenge the fairness of being second-guessed.79 In practice,
therefore, disciplinary agencies might be inclined to limit their inquiries to
easy cases, such as those in which a prosecutor transparently violates a specific
rule.80
This Article does not disregard these practical considerations, but it does
assume for purposes of its thought experiment that disciplinary agencies
nevertheless will pursue some cases involving breaches of the duty to avoid
wrongful convictions. It also assumes that, in some cases, the regulators
ultimately will be able to ascertain the relevant prosecutorial conduct. The Article
will, however, take the proof and resource issues into account when analyzing
the implications of enforcing the competence rule.
C.

The Potential Benefits of Enforcing the Competence Rule

Enforcing the competence rule would influence how prosecutors
approach their work. Some prosecutors may currently value convicting the
guilty over screening out false charges.81 Increasing the disciplinary risk of
indifference to innocence provides prosecutors with an incentive to take gate77

For example, the trial record will not show whether, in interviewing and preparing
a witness in an unrecorded meeting, the prosecutor contributed to creating false testimony.
Observers of the behavior will have reasons to give self-serving testimony.
78 See Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 11, at 737.
79 See infra Part V.A.2.
80 These resource limitations are one reason why prosecutors are rarely, if ever,
sanctioned under Rule 1.1 and other rules.
81 See supra text accompanying note 34.
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keeping seriously. It encourages prosecutors to temper overzealousness
and consider how their behavior can produce untoward results.
Similarly, implementing the competence rule would positively influence
institutional practices. The desire to guide line prosecutors and avoid
disruptions inherent in disciplinary inquiries should lead supervisory prosecutors
to help subordinate attorneys understand what competence entails, through
training and direct supervision. Supervisory prosecutors would also be given a
personal incentive to emphasize their subordinates’ role in avoiding false
convictions because, under most ethics codes, they have an independent duty
to promote compliance with the professional rules.82 Thus, implementing the
competence rule should improve prosecutorial cultures; offices with a “win at
all cost” mentality would be encouraged to place greater weight on the
government interest in preventing unjust outcomes.83
Disciplinary enforcement might lead to a better understanding of
appropriate prosecutorial conduct in other ways. Judges reviewing disciplinary
decisions would have an opportunity to express their views. Their opinions
might well go beyond what judges say in the course of trials, where they are
constrained by constitutional limits,84 evidentiary considerations,85 and (in civil
cases) prosecutorial immunity.86 A broader jurisprudence of prosecutorial
competence should result.87
As a consequence, prosecutors would inevitably become more explicit about
what they expect of themselves and each other. Prosecutors’ offices might
develop internal guidelines based on the developing judicial standards because

82 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(b) (2008) (imposing supervisory
obligations).
83 See Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. (forthcoming
2009) (manuscript at 4-8, available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1273657) (explaining
why even “ethical prosecutors” will err on the side of under-disclosing exculpatory
material); George C. Thomas III, When Lawyers Fail Innocent Defendants: Exorcising the
Ghosts that Haunt the Criminal Justice Systems, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 25, 32 (“Prosecutors
should be encouraged to avoid tunnel vision. . . . [W]e need to find more effective ways to
encourage prosecutors to seek justice rather than to win all the cases where they decide that
the defendant is guilty.”).
84 In other words, the judges will typically decide only whether constitutional minimums
have been satisfied.
85 Judges can only act based on the evidence that comes before them, which in turn is
determined by what is relevant to the legal issues in the criminal trial.
86 See supra note 43. Because of the immunity doctrine, cases rarely are brought in
which courts can express their expectations of prosecutors. Courts sometimes have
opportunities to express positions about prosecutorial conduct when dismissing civil liability
claims, but generally decline those opportunities out of a legitimate concern for judicial
restraint.
87 The jurisprudence would presumably address aspects of prosecutorial conduct about
which courts and regulators have been silent because the conduct is not governed by a
specific disciplinary rule.
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courts, in future cases, are likely to defer to internal standards adopted in good
faith.88 But even if prosecution offices do not promulgate internal regulations,
prosecutors individually, in groups within an office, or collectively through
national organizations might do so. They would be motivated to identify and
address gaps in the competence jurisprudence, both for their own protection
and to influence future judicial decision-making, by developing, collecting, and
memorializing specific conceptions of what it means to be competent.
It is unnecessary for purposes of this Article’s thought experiment to detail
all the categories of prosecutorial activity in which improved understandings
regarding appropriate conduct might develop, but it is worthwhile to consider a
few. Prosecutorial participation in gathering evidence, for example, is an area
that cries out for better analysis because it is both lightly regulated and
critical to the reliability of criminal proceedings. Many recently publicized
wrongful convictions resulted from faulty evidence produced by eyewitnesses
or experts, false confessions, and perjured accomplice testimony that
prosecutors helped prepare.89 Prosecutors could have taken steps in many of
these cases to minimize the likelihood of the faulty convictions.90 Especially
when the facts are in doubt, competent representation of the state arguably
requires prosecutors to ascertain the reliability of the evidence before relying
on it.91 Resource limitations may justify some omissions, but surely not all.
Prosecutors’ role in affirmatively producing false evidence might be another
fertile area for the development of standards. Prosecutors sometimes create false
evidence unintentionally – for example, by browbeating accomplice witnesses
or threatening to withhold leniency from witnesses who do not support the

88 Judges typically assume that prosecutors themselves are best able to evaluate the
practical pressures involved in handling their cases. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C.
Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 441-42 (2003)
[hereinafter Green & Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics] (explaining that
“federal prosecutors [have] largely unfettered discretion” in some areas, in part because
courts assume they have “unique access to information relevant to how prosecutors should
operate”).
89 See, e.g., SCHECK, supra note 15, at 53-55, 117-21, 202-03 (discussing wrongful
convictions
and
their
causes);
The
Innocence
Project,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2008) (same).
90 See CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 16, at 15 (discussing one prosecutor’s review
of cases based on eyewitness accounts, in an attempt to avoid continuing a string of
wrongful convictions).
91 Prosecutors have the unique capacity to probe the accuracy of evidence by questioning
the police about the information they have collected and matters they have neglected.
Prosecutors can interview witnesses to determine their motivation. See Melanie D. Wilson,
Prosecutors “Doing Justice” Through Osmosis – Reminders to Encourage a Culture of
Cooperation, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 69 (2008) (arguing that prosecutors have a duty “to
thoroughly and thoughtfully evaluate a cooperating defendant’s information”). Prosecutors
can also use their own investigative resources, such as the grand jury, to seek supplemental
information.
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version of events the prosecutor believes to be true.92 In preparing witnesses,
prosecutors often cause witnesses to minimize their uncertainty about inculpatory
facts or to withhold potentially exculpatory facts about which they are uncertain.93
Disciplinary decisions, judicial opinions, and prosecutorial guidelines can play a
valuable role in identifying when interviewing and preparation techniques are
unreasonable because of the likelihood that they will elicit false testimony.
A third promising subject for competence jurisprudence relates to
prosecutors’ preservation and production of exculpatory and impeachment
material. Arguably, prosecutors act unreasonably when they interfere with
defense lawyers’ ability to establish their clients’ innocence. Prosecutors
have been known to engage in such tactics as: (1) refraining from
memorializing witness statements to avoid discovery; (2) producing discoverable
information in a manner that obscures its significance; (3) coaching witnesses
to hide inconsistencies or biases; (4) discouraging witnesses from speaking or
cooperating with defense attorneys; and (5) refusing defense requests to
immunize witnesses or perform scientific tests the defense cannot afford.94
Although these activities are not categorically illegal or improper, they may
unreasonably contribute to false convictions in some contexts, particularly when
used in conjunction with other tactics. Vigorous enforcement of the
prosecutorial competence rule would encourage courts and prosecutors to
develop clearer understandings about when such conduct crosses the line.
These are just a few areas in which disciplinary enforcement of rules like
Model Rule 1.1 might lead to a more coherent view of when prosecutorial
conduct is too risky, which in turn would produce improved internal training
and oversight of prosecutors. The salutary results would be twofold: first, to
reduce the number of cases in which innocent individuals are convicted, the
ultimate point of the exercise; and second, to enhance public confidence in
prosecutors, the criminal justice system, the legal profession, and professional
self-regulation.
D.

Disciplinary Alternatives to Enforcing the Competence Rule

Let us assume the Supreme Court in Imbler was justified in looking to
professional discipline of prosecutors as a viable alternative to regulation by
civil liability. One way to analyze whether enforcing the competence rule
makes sense is to consider whether other mechanisms for invigorating the
disciplinary regime would better encourage prosecutors to avoid inculpating the
innocent.
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See Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors, supra note 18, at 953-60
(illustrating ways prosecutors unwittingly induce cooperators to corroborate prosecutors’
erroneous understandings).
93 See Bennett Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 829,
833-34, 849 (2002).
94 See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 895-97.
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Enhancing Enforcement of the Existing Rules

Disciplinary agencies might increase their enforcement of the existing
specific code provisions that address prosecutors. In practice, disciplinary
regulators have not targeted prosecutors’ unintentional or good faith violations
of these provisions.95 This tendency can be explained not only by the
regulators’ sense of fairness and desire to preserve resources for more serious
wrongdoing, but also by their uncertainty about whether the rules encompass
negligent or reckless conduct. Nevertheless, the option of more cutting-edge
enforcement clearly exists.
One problem with this approach is that the existing specific rules do not
address much of the conduct that contributes to unjust convictions. For
example, most ethics codes address prosecutors’ screening function solely
through provisions forbidding prosecution on less than probable cause.96
These provisions fail to implement the intuition (accepted by many
prosecutors) that it is unreasonable for a prosecutor to pursue a case when he
has significant doubts about the defendant’s guilt, even though a conviction
might be obtained. Likewise, the codes seem to allow prosecutors to offer
questionable evidence unless they “know” it to be false,97 even though
exploiting unreliable evidence may lead to an unjust conviction. Simply
enforcing the terms of the rules therefore will not suffice to turn society’s general
concern about wrongful convictions into a meaningful prosecutorial obligation
to avoid them.
Moreover, in practice, aggressive enforcement of the concrete existing rules
– but only these rules – would lead to punishment for prosecutorial misconduct
that is less significant than other behavior the codes do not cover. The
punishable act of willfully withholding unimportant discovery material in a slamdunk prosecution, for example, warrants no more attention than the
unpunishable failure to take easy steps to find exculpatory evidence in a
borderline case.98 If protecting innocent defendants is the primary concern,
disciplinary enforcement priorities should not always turn solely on the relative
specificity of the provisions that apply.

95

The regulators may, for example, overlook a failure to produce exculpatory evidence
that resulted from simple neglect or an erroneous legal conclusion that production was
not required.
96 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2008).
97 E.g., id. R. 3.3(a)(3).
98 It is important to note that prosecutors may engage in the worst excesses where their
evidence is weakest, in the interest of securing the conviction of defendants of whose guilt
the prosecutors are convinced. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT.
L. REV. 393, 431 (1992). Failing to pursue investigative leads or provide evidence that
could exonerate the defendant may be reasonable when there is overwhelming evidence of
guilt but not when the evidence is thin.
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Expanding the Reach of Existing Rules

An alternative for invigorating the disciplinary regime might be to liberalize
the mens rea elements of the existing rules.99 Many provisions regulating
prosecutorial behavior either require knowing misconduct or are unclear about
the applicable mens rea requirement.100 Amending the rules to address
categories of negligent or reckless behavior would facilitate discipline and, in
some cases, better align prosecutors’ professional obligations with constitutional
and statutory requirements.101
The approach of liberalizing the rules’ mens rea elements suffers from three
significant defects, however. First, it could cause prosecutors to become
excessively cautious. A strict liability or negligence standard for prosecutors’
use of false testimony, for example, would create a powerful incentive for
prosecutors to disregard all informants or cooperating witnesses who have
reasons to lie. The inflexibility of an overly demanding rule would undermine
society’s expectation that prosecutors confronting potentially unreliable
witnesses will exercise reasoned discretion – balancing the goal of achieving
appropriate convictions against the risk of convicting the innocent.
Second, reducing the state of mind requirements too far would be unfair to
prosecutors. Strict liability for an unintentional failure to disclose particular
evidence, for example, makes sense if the remedy is to correct an injustice
done to the defendant – as when an appellate court orders a new trial.
Sanctioning the prosecutor personally for a result he had little ability to
control, however, may not serve the primary goals of professional discipline;
namely, assuring that practicing lawyers have the integrity, skills, and
judgment to continue in their profession.102
99 See Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions, supra note 11, at 282-83, 299 (arguing for
discipline of prosecutors’ gross negligence).
100 For example, Model Rules 3.3(a) forbids a lawyer to “knowingly” make false
statements or offer false evidence whereas Model Rule 1.7(a), forbidding the disclosure of
client confidences and the representation of conflicting interests without client consent, has
no explicit mens rea requirement. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a), 3.3(a).
Lawyers clearly may be sanctioned for some well-intentioned misconduct, as when they
commingle client and personal funds with client consent. See WOLFRAM, supra note 60, at
177 & n.2 (1986) (discussing disciplinary regulators’ strict approach to commingling). But
when the rules are silent regarding mens rea, the requisite level of culpability often is
contestable.
101 See, e.g., United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 455-59 (2d Cir. 1991) (overturning
a conviction where prosecutors should have known that a key witness was lying); United
States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1978) (overturning a conviction where the
prosecution negligently failed to disclose witness impeachment material). Because judicial
decisions tend to focus on whether the defendant has received due process, they ordinarily
do not require intentional prosecutorial misconduct before a court will remedy a deficiency
in the trial.
102 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 687
(2004) [hereinafter Zacharias, Purposes of Discipline] (discussing the licensing goals of
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Third, simply tinkering with the existing rules (whether by reducing the
mens rea requirements or otherwise expanding the rules’ reach), would
probably not address the more global causes of false convictions. The
substantive scope of the existing rules is narrow. Prosecutorial conduct falling
outside the rules’ limited purview is as likely to produce erroneous convictions
as the conduct the rules cover. Under the existing rules, for example, failing to
disclose exculpatory evidence is covered but failing to seek likely exculpatory
evidence is not. Indeed, as the corporate fraud scenario described in Section B
illustrates, prosecutors can contribute to faulty convictions through a series of
acts none of which alone would be punishable under the ethics codes’ targeted
provisions. Reformulating the existing standards’ knowledge requirements or
otherwise tinkering with the existing rules thus might cause prosecutors to
become vigilant in a few narrow contexts, but would ignore equally or more
problematic, yet unregulated, behavior.
3.

Codifying New Obligations

The most plausible alternative to enforcing an open-ended provision, such as
the general competence rule, would involve a dedicated recodification effort.
The professional code drafters might adopt a series of additional provisions
specifying actions prosecutors must take to minimize the risk of false
convictions. Presumably, each new rule would target the kinds of conduct that
are likely to, and have in the past, led to erroneous results.
While intuitively appealing, this approach, too, has limitations.103 Initially,
it would be difficult for a code to anticipate or define with precision all
illegitimate conduct that is likely to result in wrongful convictions.104 One
may simply not be able to codify society’s intuitions about when prosecutors
should pursue investigative leads that might exonerate a defendant, when
rigorous preparation or questioning of witnesses becomes unreasonable, and
when facts suggesting guilt are too attenuated to justify a prosecution. More
importantly, as already mentioned, prosecutorial behavior that is likely to
result in a false conviction often will not reflect a discrete act or omission, but
rather a course of conduct.105
discipline and suggesting that punishment is a relatively minor goal); see also Fred C.
Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript
at 38, on file with authors) (“Professional discipline serves many functions, of which
punishment of the lawyer may be the least important.”).
103 Cf. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, supra note 52, at 1581-85.
104 Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 47, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1313215)
(“Bar rules cannot capture the myriad complex factors that rightly or wrongly influence patterns
of prosecutorial discretion across cases.”).
105 United States v. Koubriti, 336 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. Mich. 2004), a recent terrorism
prosecution, has frequently been used to illustrate how a course of prosecutorial conduct –
involving, among other things, witness coaching, failure to record interviews, withholding
discovery, and inflammatory arguments – can lead to false convictions. E.g., Bennett L.
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Moreover, extensive but incomplete codification of rules designed to
prevent prosecutorial participation in wrongful convictions could be
counterproductive. When code drafters reduce broad principles of fairness
and reasonableness to specific actions prosecutors must undertake or avoid,
prosecutors are likely to develop rule-centered mind-sets. Prosecutors may
come to focus exclusively on particular prohibitions and avoid introspection
about the broader obligation to avoid false convictions from which the
prohibitions stem.106 A game-like attitude would result, with prosecutors
interpreting the rules literally and viewing the codes as requiring nothing more
than the specified behavior.107 A rule-based focus also creates a danger that
prosecutors will attempt to circumvent even the concrete prohibitions rather
than seeking to comply with the code’s spirit.108
E.

Concluding Thoughts

Code provisions, statutes, and administrative regulations that identify and
prohibit (or require) particular prosecutorial conduct deserve a role in
prosecutorial regulation. When it is obvious that specific categories of
behavior are improper, clear, enforceable, and enforced prohibitions work
better than general standards subject to interpretation by prosecutors and
regulators. Thus, for example, rules forbidding the intentional use of false
Gershman, How Juries Get It Wrong: Anatomy of the Detroit Terror Case, 44 WASHBURN
L.J. 327, 330-41 (2005); Sam Roberts, Note, Should Prosecutors Be Required to Record
Their Pretrial Interviews with Accomplices and Snitches?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 257-60
(2005).
106 One benefit of constructing general rules is that “leaving implementation to lawyers
may encourage lawyers to think about the appropriateness of their conduct – be it in
‘ethical’ or simply ‘role appropriate’ terms.” Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional
Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 261 (1993) [hereinafter Zacharias, Specificity]. Conversely,
“strict rules tend to prevent lawyers from engaging in serious introspection concerning their
personal responsibility to help achieve good results.” Id. at 262.
107 Overly precise rules have the affect of appearing all-inclusive, and consequently fail
to identify broader goals and standards lawyers can apply in a variety of situations. See id.
at 262 (“A highly specific professional requirement . . . risks stultifying lawyers’
independent evaluation of appropriate responses.”).
108 To give an example: Granting immunity to prosecution witnesses increases the
possibility of false testimony but cannot be completely forbidden because some matters
justify immunity. A specific rule forbidding immunity grants would necessarily be written
in an under-inclusive way. Prosecutors, however, might come to view the rule as
establishing the outer limits on their behavior rather than as a disciplinary minimum. In
other words, the specific but under-inclusive rule could discourage prosecutors from
considering when grants of immunity not proscribed by the rule are inappropriate.
Moreover, even in covered situations, prosecutors might seek alternative means for
encouraging the potentially unreliable testimony because the rule teaches them to think only
in the concrete terms of “no immunity” rather than the principle that prosecutors should
avoid tainting testimony.
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evidence or the intentional failure to disclose exculpatory material make
considerable sense.
In other circumstances, however, implementing a broad prosecutorial
competence rule has obvious advantages. The primary benefit is that it can
take into account the totality of a prosecutor’s behavior.109 It enables
regulators to consider whether the cumulative effect of a series of actions, each
of which alone might be harmless or forgivable, created an unreasonable risk
of convicting the innocent. More importantly, the open-textured standard
forces prosecutors to evaluate their own conduct in context – to determine not
only whether it violates a specific prohibition or legal standard, but also whether
it contributes to an inappropriate result.
If the only goal in regulating prosecutorial conduct were to prevent wrongful
convictions, a better alternative might be the legalization (through codes or
statutes) of a series of prophylactic protections for defendants. Society might
require prosecutors to videotape all witness and suspect interviews, open their
files, identify all potential witnesses for either side, conduct any scientific
tests or investigations requested by the defense, or even conduct
examinations of all witnesses in a way that elicits information beneficial to the
defendant. Some or all of these approaches, however, might increase the risk
of perjury or witness tampering by the defendant or simply tilt the balance in
criminal law enforcement too far in favor of the defense. Employing the
general competence standard would allow the regulators to take equal account
of society’s interest in maintaining zealous advocates for the prosecution. By
definition, the standard itself is neither over- nor under-inclusive because it is
flexible, as broad principles tend to be.
If courts and disciplinary agencies take seriously the project of implementing
a competence rule against prosecutors, their interpretations of the rule can lead to
common law development of standards providing real guidance for future
conduct. In other words, the regulators – and ultimately the state supreme
courts – would be able to elaborate upon societal intuitions regarding a variety
of prosecutorial behavior in the context of concrete facts.110 The emerging
jurisprudence in turn would strengthen the hands of trial judges exercising
supervisory authority over prosecutors by providing a basis for assessing
prosecutorial behavior.
The possibility of disciplinary and judicial
enforcement would create incentives for prosecutors’ offices to develop and
codify their own understandings of reasonable conduct.

109

Much of the Article’s analysis may apply equally to the implementation of general
ethics concepts governing prosecutors other than competence (e.g., the duties to avoid
“conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” or to “serve justice”).
110 See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of
Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 2-6, on file authors)
[hereinafter Zacharias & Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation] (discussing the
differences between adopting ethics rules ex ante and developing standards in concrete
cases).
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Of course, the most important impact of enforcing a general duty of care
would be on the mind-set of individual prosecutors. It would require them to
engage in introspection about their conduct, not simply assess its compliance
with specific code requirements. Thus, in every case, prosecutors would need
to act carefully in all aspects of their work that give rise to a risk of false
convictions, including post-conviction work.
When we propose, as our thought experiment, serious disciplinary
enforcement of the competence rule, we are simply suggesting that the
regulators depart from the current, de facto policy of abstaining from
prosecutorial discipline. In practice, we assume that even the proposed
enforcement policy would lead to discipline relatively rarely, because
investigations into prosecutorial conduct would probably require a triggering
event highlighting unreasonably risky conduct – including, but not limited to, a
judicial or prosecutorial repudiation of a previous conviction, a judicial referral
of a prosecutor for discipline, or news reports concerning prosecutors who
have engaged in improprieties.
If disciplinary inquiries are likely to be rare, however, one might ask “what
is the point”? The broad answer is that the potential for external regulation in
general has proven to be a positive influence upon lawyers.111 There is a
virtue in affirming the possibility of enforcing prosecutorial obligations that
ordinarily are left to self-regulation. Occasional implementation of the
competence rule will ideally result in clearer standards of conduct, thereby
providing guidance for well-intentioned prosecutors that cannot develop when
the rule is entirely unenforced.
Moreover, even occasional instances of discipline may have a beneficial
effect on public perceptions. It is fair to say that lay and scholarly criticism of
disciplinary regulators’ failure to control prosecutors has sometimes been
exaggerated; there are reasons why professional discipline of prosecutors
historically has been muted, some having to do with practical concerns, others
with resource-allocation issues.112 Nevertheless, when prosecutorial misconduct
and the innocence of convicted defendants are reported in the press, it creates
a natural sense in the public that “something should be done.”113 The failure of
disciplinary agencies to pursue the participating prosecutors creates mistrust in
the lawyer-regulatory system. Providing disciplinary regulators with a tool

111

See Wilkins, supra note 66, at 832 (discussing how credible threats of malpractice
liability have influenced lawyers’ conduct).
112 See Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 11, at 756-62.
113 See Genson & Martin, supra note 11, at 40 (suggesting that disciplinary authorities
should have responded to reported instances of prosecutorial misconduct in Cook County);
Rosen, supra note 11, at 697, 733-36 (arguing that judicial decisions revealing Brady
violations should have been followed by professional discipline); cf. JOHN WESLEY HALL,
JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWYER § 11:3, at 390 (2d ed. 1996)
(“The relative paucity of disciplinary actions against prosecutors . . . demonstrates that there
is a disciplinary double standard.”).
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they can realistically implement in such cases, even if only occasionally, would
help address the demand for reform.
A full definition of the prosecutorial duty to avoid wrongful convictions under
provisions like Model Rule 1.1 would need to await judicial interpretation over
time. But our understanding of the competence rule envisions application of
an objective standard – a focus upon the reasonableness of the prosecutor’s
conduct, not the prosecutor’s subjective intentions or beliefs. For reasons
discussed in Part IV,114 our proposal also presumes that the reasonableness of a
prosecutor’s conduct will not turn on an evaluation of whether the conduct is
conventional, as in legal malpractice cases. The disciplinary standard should
focus on the actual risk of false conviction that each prosecutor’s own behavior
creates.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO INTERPRETING THE COMPETENCE RULE AS
ENCOMPASSING PROSECUTORIAL NEGLIGENCE
The proposed application of Model Rule 1.1 requires an interpretation that
the rule’s vague competence standard encompasses unreasonable prosecutorial
behavior. The assumption that the term “competent representation” applies to
all lawyers, in all their functions, is intuitively appealing. One can imagine a
series of interpretive arguments, however, that would confine the rule to
representation of individual clients by private attorneys. Alternatively, insofar
as the rule applies to prosecutors, it might be limited to behavior that
undermines the prosecutorial objective of convicting the guilty. We identify
the best of these arguments and offer refutations below.
Before proceeding, however, it is worth noting that the viability of the
enforcement regime proposed in this Article ultimately does not rest on the
interpretive issues discussed here. Even if the existing competence rule could
not be read to encompass unreasonable prosecutorial acts that risk false
convictions, the rule could be amended to include those acts. At its core, this
Article challenges proponents of the proposal to justify discipline of
prosecutors on policy grounds, as earlier Parts of the Article have attempted to
do,115 and challenges opponents to counter the policy justifications with
equally significant policy concerns. Some of these concerns will be discussed
in Parts V and VI.
That said, the interpretive questions are important from both a normative
perspective and the perspective of institutional legitimacy. If the proposed
interpretation of Model Rule 1.1 is implausible and a significantly different
rule would be necessary to police the prosecutorial conduct in question, that
might support a claim that the effort to discipline prosecutors unfairly singles
them out116 or goes beyond the type of ethics concerns that are traditionally

114
115
116

See infra Part IV.E.
See supra Part III.E.
See infra Part V.A.1.
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within the province of disciplinary regulators.117 The following analysis,
however, suggests that the existing rule, which captures a core expectation of
competence by all lawyers, can comfortably be interpreted as addressing
prosecutorial negligence.
A.

Prosecutors Do Not Represent the Defendant

Model Rule 1.1 is a client-protective rule that derives from the lawyer’s
fiduciary duty to his clients. Hence, the rule refers to competent representation
of “a client,” which generally means acting in a manner reasonably necessary
to achieve the client’s objectives. In the scenarios encompassed by this
Article’s proposal, however, the main beneficiaries of the duty to avoid
wrongful convictions are criminal defendants, who are not a prosecutor’s
clients. Moreover, prosecutors owe defendants no fiduciary obligations.
Because defendants have no personal claim upon a prosecutor’s representation,
interpreting Model Rule 1.1 as establishing defendants’ rights is arguably an
unwarranted departure from the rule’s client-protective objectives.
This view is strengthened when one analogizes incompetence under the
disciplinary rule to the notion of incompetence in professional malpractice law.
Legal malpractice decisions recognize only a few areas in which lawyers owe a
duty of competence to non-clients,118 and these mostly involve situations in
which the non-clients’ interests are aligned with those of the client.119
Malpractice jurisprudence usually does not authorize liability for acts or
omissions harmful to targets of a client’s lawsuit. If one conceives of the
prosecutor’s role as equivalent to that of a private lawyer suing an adversary,
the requirement of competence could not include a vigorous obligation to
protect the adversary’s interests.
The flaw in this interpretation of Model Rule 1.1 is the assumption that a
prosecutor’s actual client, the state, has no interest in avoiding false
convictions. Competent representation of the state is unique in that
government lawyers are not expected to engage exclusively in an adversarial
quest for victory.120 Prosecutors are charged with seeking to achieve the

117

See infra Part VI.B.
See Fred C. Zacharias, Lawyer Duties to Amorphous Non-Clients, PROF. LAW., Aug.
1997, at 1, 4-5 (1997) (discussing situations in which lawyers have enforceable obligations to
third parties).
119 For example, when the non-client is a third-party beneficiary of a contract or will or
when the client has obtained an opinion letter for the benefit of the non-client in order to
complete a cooperative venture. See id.
120 See, e.g., George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV.
98, 110 (1975) (arguing that one of prosecutors’ “major functions” is seeking “release of the
innocent”); H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1704 (2000) (“The mindset with which the
prosecutor should approach [investigation and screening] is different from the advocate
shoring up a somewhat equivocal case; it is the mindset of the true skeptic, the inquisitive
118
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multiple objectives of criminal law enforcement.121 These include not only
convicting (some of) the guilty and seeking proportional punishment, but also
obtaining results that are just and that afford defendants fair process.122 Thus,
when prosecutors promote wrongful convictions, they undermine the
objectives of their client, the state, as well as the interests of the third-party
defendant. The duty of competence they violate runs to the client.
Of course, the fact that prosecutors serve multiple, potentially conflicting
objectives adds a level of complexity. Prosecutors can hardly be expected to go to
the same lengths to avoid wrongful convictions as criminal defense lawyers,
for whom the paramount objective is preventing convictions and minimizing
punishment. From the prosecutor’s perspective, the objective of safeguarding
defendants’ interests must be balanced against the mandate to pursue just
prosecutions zealously, within the bounds of the law. Nevertheless, the fairest
view of the prosecutorial function is that good representation of the state
includes a serious effort to assure accurate verdicts. On that view, the failure
to fulfill that function is incompetence within the meaning of Model Rule 1.1.
B.

The Adversarial Criminal Justice Process Prevents and Corrects Error

A second possible objection to this Article’s interpretation of Model Rule
1.1 centers on the assumption that creating a risk of a false conviction can be
unreasonable. Prosecutors act within an adversary system. In the purest
conception of the adversary system, so long as prosecutors operate legally, the
system will compensate for litigation conduct that is prejudicial to defendants.
For example, defense attorneys will be able to elicit that prosecutors have
browbeaten or over-influenced witnesses, jurors will avoid false inferences
prosecutors urge them to draw, and the combination of cross-examination,
judicial oversight, and juror wisdom will expose the unreliability of evidence
prosecutors introduce.
Unlike a prosecutor’s under-zealousness, overzealousness is presumptively corrected by other players in the adversary
neutral.”). Stated another way, victory for the state is not always equivalent to a verdict of
guilty.
121 Cumulatively, these objectives are commonly termed the prosecutor’s obligation to serve
justice.
122 See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual
Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 236-37 (1988) (discussing prosecutors’ role in
protecting defendants’ procedural and substantive rights); Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as
Usual, supra note 52, at 1577 (identifying the prosecutorial functions of “assuring fair and
proportional punishment of the guilty, protecting the innocent from punishment, assuring
fair treatment of those affected by the criminal process, and assuring compliance with
constitutional and other legal provisions”); H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in
Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1168 (1973)
(arguing that prosecutors have some obligation “to protect the innocent” by sifting the
evidence, but that they should not act as the “sole arbiter of truth and justice”); Zacharias,
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, supra note 35, at 60 (discussing the prosecutor’s obligation to
assure a fair playing field).
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system.123 Under this conception, prosecutors never create an “unreasonable”
risk of a false conviction because the adversary process, by definition,
produces reasonable results. Thus, prosecutors should not be subject to
discipline for unreasonable behavior under rules like Model Rule 1.1.
This interpretation of competent representation suggests that a prosecutor
has an obligation to exercise care in carrying out legally assigned tasks (including
those aimed at preventing wrongful convictions), but no broader duty. Thus,
for example, a prosecutor would need to comply with statutory and
constitutional discovery obligations. He would, however, have no duty to
refrain from prosecuting doubtful cases, to avoid unintentionally producing or
presenting perjured testimony, or to take steps to exculpate a defendant. The
adversary system will address those issues better than any prosecutorial
incentives that might be created by an over-inclusive reading of the
competence rule.
This interpretation, however, reflects a misunderstanding of the
prosecutorial role. Both courts and professional code drafters have recognized
that prosecutors do have some duty to serve “justice.”124 Implicit in this
conclusion is a recognition that the criminal investigative and trial processes
are fallible and that prosecutors therefore have some functions, beyond simply
presenting the prosecution’s case, that compensate for the fallibility of the
process.125 Even if one believes strongly in the adversary system, the codes’ and
judicial references to prosecutors’ “justice” role suggest it would be wrong to
assume that the code drafters rely on the purest form of adversarial ideals.126
What does this signify for the interpretation of Model Rule 1.1? First, it
disposes of the claim that the rule could not be intended to cover unreasonable
prosecutorial acts because the adversary system is infallible and prevents any
acts from “unreasonably” risking an erroneous result. Second, it militates
against the notion that “illegality” provides the appropriate dividing line for
when prosecutorial behavior is unreasonable. There is simply no basis for
believing that legal standards existing at any point in time encompass all
unduly risky behavior or prevent all imbalances within the adversary system;
to the contrary, specific rules governing prosecutorial conduct are scarce. The
competence rule arguably serves to fill the most significant gaps.

123 Cf. Thomas, supra note 83, at 27 (“One reason we argue about procedural niceties
rather than fundamental questions about justice is our smug belief that few criminal
convictions are wrongful.”).
124 E.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2008).
125 See Zacharias, Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, supra note 35, at 49.
126 See id. at 66-79 (discussing contexts in which, even under a model emphasizing the
adversary system, prosecutors sometimes have an obligation to assist or remedy defects in
the defense).
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Other Players’ Negligence

It might be argued that prosecutors are less responsible for avoiding
erroneous convictions than other participants in the adversary system. Even if
avoiding wrongful convictions is a goal of Model Rule 1.1, it may be the
competence of these other participants that the rule calls into question. Thus,
for example, a prosecutor’s successful introduction of false testimony or
reliance on a defendant’s false plea usually results primarily from the defense
attorney’s failure to investigate or to counsel her client adequately. On this
view, one should interpret the competence rule in adversarial terms – as
providing a basis for discipline only for those lawyers who fail to do their own
jobs well enough to prevent the adversary (e.g., the prosecutor) from achieving
an inappropriate victory. This interpretation, for the most part, would
foreclose the rule from prescribing affirmative prosecutorial obligations to
assist (or avoid risky behavior against) the defense.
This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, it suffers from an
inaccurate, or exaggerated, factual assumption. Although other actors may
sometimes be more responsible than prosecutors for aspects of criminal trials
that result in false convictions, that is not always the case. A prosecutor may,
for instance, be in sole possession of information about the pressure he has
brought to bear on witnesses. The prosecutor may alone have the resources to
conduct investigations that might exonerate a defendant.
Second, although this form of adversary system argument might make sense
with respect to errors produced in part by the failure of defense counsel, it does
not follow equally with respect to errors produced by non-lawyer participants
in the system – including police, witnesses, judges, and jurors. The
professional rules cannot control the actions of these participants. So in
assessing whether the competence provisions address potentially inaccurate
verdicts, the choice becomes one of regulating prosecutors, who contribute
somewhat to the false convictions, or of regulating no one.
Third, the argument overlooks the fact that competence as a lawyer often
includes rectifying others’ failures. For example, criminal defense lawyers
must consider whether their clients have lied to them. Civil litigators must
counteract potential witnesses who hide evidence. Prosecutors are no
different; competent prosecuting involves rooting out the errors and
misconduct of other actors who fail to play their assigned roles.127 The only
distinction is that this effort must sometimes be taken not with an eye toward
winning, but rather with an eye toward the government-client’s alternative
objective of avoiding false convictions.
Finally, the notion that others share responsibility for producing false
convictions does not justify the conclusion that prosecutors should not be, and
therefore are not intended to be, regulated under Model Rule 1.1. Nothing
about the rule suggests that it incorporates ideas of comparative negligence.
127 See id. at 71-72, 87-88 (arguing, inter alia, that prosecutors must sometimes correct
for deficiencies in the performance of defense counsel and judges).
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So long as avoiding behavior likely to produce a false conviction is part of the
function of a lawyer representing a client – be it the lawyer representing the
defendant or the prosecutor representing the state – failing in that function
seems to be incompetence even if others are incompetent as well.
D.

Specific Rules Cover the Field of Prosecutorial Care

One might argue that the existence of specific professional rules governing
prosecutorial behavior militates against interpreting the vague competence rule
as imposing additional obligations. The argument has two variations. First, it
may rely on the principle of construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
In other words, when rules forbid particular conduct, they should be read
implicitly to authorize related conduct that is not proscribed. Second, even if
the existing rules governing prosecutorial conduct are not meant to cover the
entire field, the existing rules arguably cover so much of the field that the
competence rule has no meaningful part to play in regulating prosecutors.
In the context of the disciplinary codes, both arguments have inherent flaws.
The codes are full of examples in which the drafters provide both general and
specific rules governing the same category of conduct.128 With respect to
regulation of prosecutorial conduct in particular, the existence of specific
prohibitions in Model Rule 3.8129 do not obviate the applicability to
prosecutors of other provisions governing all lawyers, such as confidentiality
rules and rules governing candor to the courts.130 The expressio unius
principle clearly has no general role to play in the interpretation of the
professional codes.131
The argument from the content of the specific rules governing prosecutorial
conduct is even weaker. The specific rules cover very little prosecutorial
activity. It is simply counter-factual to assume that they are intended to
preempt the field.
More generally, both arguments overlook the fact that separate rules often
encompass the same behavior for different reasons, with the result that one rule
can provide a basis for discipline when the other would not. Consider, for
128

Most notably, the general conflict of interest provision (Model Rule 1.7) is followed
immediately by a series of specific conflict prohibitions (Model Rule 1.8), some of which
are encompassed by the general provision, and some of which are not. MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8 (2008); cf. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive
Rules of Professional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265, 292-94 (2006) (suggesting that
disciplinary rules which appear to give lawyers discretion do not invariably reflect a
judgment that other rules impose no further restrictions).
129 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (describing the special responsibilities,
prohibitions, and affirmative obligations of a prosecutor).
130 See Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1033, 1035 (2007) (“[G]overnment lawyers appear to be bound by the same broad
confidentiality obligation as lawyers for private sector clients.”).
131 That is not to gainsay the possibility that the principle can be helpful in
interpreting specific language of a particular rule.
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example, Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) – a rule equally applicable to prosecutors and
defense attorneys – and its relationship to the general competence provision.
Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) forbids a lawyer to “offer evidence that the lawyer knows
to be false.”132 The arguments discussed here would suggest that because
Model Rule 3.3(a) forbids only knowing acts, it reflects a judgment that a
lawyer should not be disciplined for negligently or recklessly offering false
testimony. This conclusion does not hold true, however, because the
competence rule might separately authorize discipline in some situations in
which a lawyer offers false testimony with lesser mens rea.
To illustrate the point, assume that a civil litigator does not know, but
reasonably believes, that particular prospective testimony is false. She also
knows that the jury is likely to view the testimony as perjured and, if it is
introduced, would discredit separate, more important testimony that is
otherwise credible. The lawyer nevertheless introduces the questionable
testimony, in the process undermining the client’s chances of winning the case.
This lawyer would not be disciplinable under Model Rule 3.3(a), but might be
subject to discipline for incompetence under Model Rule 1.1.
The same syllogism should hold true for prosecutors. A prosecutor who
offers testimony he reasonably believes, but does not know, to be false cannot
be disciplined under Model Rule 3.3(a). If, however, introducing that
testimony would undermine the government-client’s objectives, the prosecutor
should be subject to discipline under the competence rule, just like the private
attorney in the scenario above. The fact that other specific rules govern
prosecutorial behavior does not change the equation.
E.

Prosecutors’ Competence Should Be Defined by Convention

In civil malpractice cases, negligence is ordinarily determined by resort to
the prevailing norms in the local professional community.133 The test for
constitutionally ineffective representation by criminal defense counsel is
essentially the same.134 One might therefore argue that community standards –
i.e., what prosecutors ordinarily do – are the appropriate benchmark of
prosecutorial competence. If Model Rule 1.1 is interpreted with that
conception in mind, disciplining prosecutors who create an unreasonable risk
of false convictions would become difficult, because disciplinary agencies
could only target prosecutors who depart from the practices typically employed
in their offices. The regulators could not develop independent prosecutorial
standards.

132

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (emphasis added).
See WOLFRAM, supra note 60, at 213 (“A lawyer’s duty under malpractice law is to
conform to the commonly prevailing and reasonable standards of practice.”).
134 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (“The court must . . .
determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”).
133
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In the private lawyer context, it might make sense to resort to
conventional practice when defining disciplinary incompetence. The
malpractice case law is extensive, providing substantial insights into what
constitutes negligence and the sense in which courts use the term
“competence.” Case law is less helpful in the prosecutorial context, because
prosecutorial immunity has foreclosed judicial inquiry into these issues. This
complicates the ability of disciplinary regulators to assess either what acts
constitute incompetence under the community standard or whether applying a
community standard is a viable approach for setting prosecutorial practice
norms.
Moreover, unlike conventional practices identified in civil malpractice
cases, standards developed by prosecutors as a professional subgroup are not
self-validating. They are neither adopted transparently nor subject to market
forces that encourage competent practice. Prosecutors’ conventions therefore may
be based on a shared view of self-interest or a mistaken perspective on what
benefits the state.
Intuitively, there are at least two other reasons to doubt that a community
standard could produce meaningful behavioral norms. First, all the prosecutors
in each jurisdiction’s prosecuting office are governed by a single set of internal
commands and regulations, so the community standard would simply become
“whatever the chief prosecutor wants his office to do.” Second, when a
community standard is applied in civil malpractice cases, courts start from the
premise that the clients disapprove of the lawyers’ conduct because they have
sued. In contrast, prosecutors who comply with the office’s internal
commands can reasonably assert that the client has blessed their conduct,
because the chief prosecutor personifies the client and makes the client
decisions in criminal cases. Presumably, disciplinary regulators should be able
to assess and take into account the government-client’s interest in avoiding false
convictions through a more impartial mechanism.
For purposes of this Article’s inquiry, we therefore posit that disciplinary
regulators should avoid a community-based standard for competence. The
regulators need to render an independent policy judgment about the
reasonableness of conduct that undermines the reliability of the criminal
process. Thus, for example, even if prosecutors’ conventions would allow
prosecutors to introduce inculpatory evidence they believe (but do not know)
to be false, in pertinent cases prosecutors would be required to justify the
conventions in light of prosecutors’ multiple objectives.
V.

NORMATIVE OBJECTIONS TO IMPLEMENTING THE COMPETENCE RULE
AGAINST PROSECUTORS

Thus far, this Article has identified reasons to discipline prosecutors for
negligent conduct that risks false convictions, suggested the contours of
potential disciplinary proceedings, and demonstrated the plausibility of
interpreting the competence rule to reach such conduct. Here we look at the
possible normative objections to implementing the competence standard
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against prosecutors and consider whether more harm than good would result
from doing so.
A.

Fairness Considerations
1.

Asymmetry or Singling Out

Prosecutors might argue that robust enforcement of the competence rule
would result in a harsher sanctioning standard for them than for private
attorneys. In theory, all lawyers must be competent. This Article has
proposed, however, that prosecutors might be disciplined not only when they
fail to represent their clients aggressively, but also when they fail to adequately
protect the interests of their adversary. Although we have justified discipline
as vindicating the objectives of the prosecutor’s client – the state – the proposal
in practice may result in a disproportionate number of disciplinary sanctions
against government attorneys or the sanctioning of prosecutors when private
lawyers with comparable culpability would not be sanctioned.
Arguably, such asymmetry is appropriate because prosecutorial negligence has
unusually serious consequences, including the stigma of false convictions and
a possible loss of liberty. That is not invariably true, however. Incompetence
by criminal defense attorneys poses an equal risk of faulty convictions. Private
lawyers’ errors in civil matters also can cause serious harm.135
Focusing on prosecutorial incompetence through the disciplinary process
may nevertheless be justified as a counter-balance to prosecutors’ more favorable
treatment in other contexts and the absence of alternative deterrents to
prosecutorial misconduct. The potential for malpractice liability and discipline
for violating specific professional rules provide incentives for private lawyers
to exercise care and minimize even inadvertent mistakes. Prosecutors, in
contrast, are immune from civil liability136 and, historically, have had little
reason to fear enforcement of specific ethics rules.137 Other legal mechanisms
addressing prosecutorial misconduct do not effectively promote competence:
judicial reversals of convictions for prosecutorial misconduct impose no
sanctions directly on offending prosecutors;138 and administrative sanctions

135 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction in Professional Responsibility, 7
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 172-73 (1996) (questioning the assumption that criminal and
civil matters should be treated differently because criminal cases automatically encompass
more serious consequences).
136 See supra text accompanying note 43.
137 See Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 11, at 743-55 (demonstrating
empirically the rarity of prosecutor discipline).
138 See Meares, supra note 60, at 900 (“Reversal is not a true sanction, as it is not
specifically directed towards punishing the prosecutor.”).
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often fail because, by the time misconduct is identified, offending prosecutors
are no longer members of the office that had jurisdiction over them.139
The general history of infrequent prosecutorial discipline also supports
treating prosecutors uniquely.140 Whenever ethics rules are under-enforced,
there is a significant likelihood that the absence of discipline will foster
complacency – if not utter disregard for the code – among the rules’ targets.141
Enforcement of the competence provision against prosecutors would help
counteract this phenomenon; it would encourage prosecutors to treat with
respect the body of ethics obligations that are imposed on them.
2.

Vagueness and the Absence of Standards

Model Rule 1.1 defines competence as “requir[ing] the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”142 Whether a prosecutor has performed negligently thus
would depend on application of the open-textured standard of whether he has
exercised judgment or thoroughness that is “reasonably necessary” under the
circumstances of the case. Allowing discipline based on such a vague standard
arguably puts prosecutors at the mercy of haphazard review.143 The virtue of
the vague standard is that, in theory, it is neither over- nor under-inclusive –
allowing judges to adjust the standard in the context of each case. But the
corresponding vice is that the standard deprives prosecutors of antecedent
notice regarding appropriate conduct.
Over time, disciplinary opinions may flesh out the standard by explaining the
regulators’ conclusions about particular factual scenarios. That presumes, however,
that the regulators will avoid private reprimands and publicize their
decisions.144 And even if a prosecutorial competence standard can develop in

139 See Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors, supra note 75, at 85 (“[A] federal
prosecutor may avoid [OPR] scrutiny by leaving government employ.”); Green &
Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, supra note 88, at 404 (“Reversals
frequently occur after the prosecutor has left office, so that even administrative reprisals will
have no effect on him.”).
140 See sources cited supra note 11.
141 See Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody’s Watching: Legal
Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 971, 1005-12 (2002).
142 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2008).
143 In applying a professional code’s competence standard to private attorneys, lawyers
and disciplinary courts can look to the parallel civil law, an approach that is not equally
available in the prosecutorial context. See supra text accompanying note 133.
144 Many jurisdictions frequently rely on private reprimands in cases involving private
attorneys. Moreover, in most jurisdictions, when disciplinary verdicts exonerate an accused
lawyer, the entire proceedings remain secret, thus preventing those decisions from
contributing to the development of legal standards. See Green, Policing Federal
Prosecutors, supra note 75, at 88 (“[T]he secrecy of disciplinary proceedings makes the
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common-law fashion, prosecutors have a fair complaint that the vague rule
initially leaves them uncertain about their obligations. It poses a risk that wellintentioned but insufficiently cautious prosecutors will be sanctioned.
The problem of inadequate notice is not unique to prosecutors.145
Individuals with doubt about the reach of the criminal law are expected to steer
clear of areas of uncertainty. Because ethics codes govern lawyers, who are
specifically trained to ascertain the law’s reach, disciplinary authorities have
reason to be unsympathetic to an argument by prosecutors based on a lack of
specificity.146
Prosecutors might contend, however, that the decision not to measure
competence according to conventional practice147 makes it especially difficult
for prosecutors to identify appropriate conduct on their own. Similarly,
because a well-run prosecution office depends on a chain of command,
prosecutors may claim that disciplinary authorities should excuse prosecutorial
conduct that satisfies supervisors’ instructions or internal office policies.148
From a disciplinary perspective, however, lawyers must think for
themselves.149 Given the power prosecutors wield – often without direct, handson supervision – it is particularly important for them to exercise independent
professional judgment.
To respond to the hazards inherent in the vagueness of the competence rule,
disciplinary agencies might be tempted to limit discipline to cases in which (1)
a prosecutor has intentionally sought an inappropriate result or engaged in
reckless behavior, or (2) it is established that an innocent defendant has in fact
been convicted. These limitations, however, would undermine the goal of
encouraging prosecutors to evaluate the effects of their behavior in a wide
range of situations in which faulty convictions may occur. Requiring proof of

disciplinary process almost entirely ineffective in defining and deterring prosecutorial
misconduct.”).
145 See Bruce A. Green, Criminal Defense Lawyering at the Edge: A Look Back, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 353, 386-87 (2007) (observing that “[c]riminal defense lawyers, and
others, still encounter many uncertainties [regarding their ethical obligations]”).
146 See Howell v. State Bar of Tex., 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
disciplinary rule was not unconstitutionally vague because lawyers have the benefit of
guidance provided by “case law, court rules and the ‘lore of the profession’” (citation
omitted)).
147 See supra text accompanying note 133.
148 The claim is strongest with respect to arguably proper conduct that a subordinate
prosecutor undertakes in reliance upon a supervisor’s reasonable instruction. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2(b) (2008) (“A subordinate lawyer does not violate the
Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer’s
reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.”).
149 See, e.g., N.Y. City Bar Ass’n, Op. 82-79 (1982) (providing a suggested course of
action for associates who suspect misconduct by partners), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS &
NORMAN DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 735-36 (2d ed.
1989).
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actual harm would also be inconsistent with the thrust of the professional
codes, which seek to deter misconduct ex ante; the competence rule does not
include causation and harm requirements precisely because its purpose is
guidance.150
Disciplinary authorities, of course, are free to exercise discretion to
implement the competence rule more frequently in cases involving intentional
misconduct or in which a false conviction has occurred.151 As a practical
matter, evidence of intentionality or innocence would confirm the regulators’
intuitions about the wrongfulness of a prosecutor’s conduct and make
incompetence easier to prove. Emphasizing proof of innocence would help
counteract the consequences of vagueness in the standard by limiting discipline
to serious cases. Nevertheless, completely restricting the rule to such cases
simply because of the practical concerns would unjustifiably reduce the rule’s
impact.
The conflicting benefits and costs of specificity in professional rulemaking
is not a new conundrum.152 Enforcement of the open-textured competence
provision would give rise to reasonable concerns both about how standards
will develop and about the provision of fair notice. But, given the ordinary
premises of attorney discipline, these concerns alone are not sufficient to
dispense with the competence remedy for prosecutorial misconduct.
B.

The Psychological Impact of Discipline on Prosecutors

The proposal to enforce the competence rule against prosecutors
presumes that enforcement will affect prosecutors’ approach to their work.
The proposal anticipates a positive influence. Arguably, however, the potential
for discipline can also have adverse effects on prosecutors’ attitudes.
1.

The Risk of Over-Deterrence

In Imbler v. Pachtman, the Supreme Court suggested that, if aggrieved
defendants could sue prosecutors civilly, “harassment by unfounded litigation”

150

See Zacharias, Purposes of Discipline, supra note 102, at 698 (identifying nine goals
of imposing professional discipline, only two of which turn on actual injury having resulted
from the sanctioned lawyer’s conduct).
151 Defining the “exoneration” necessary to trigger a disciplinary investigation might
prove conceptually difficult. Very few wrongly convicted defendants are ever exonerated
completely. In some cases, a defendant may receive a new trial because the original
conviction was procedurally defective and, because of doubts about guilt or the loss of
evidence resulting from the passage of time, the prosecution office may decide not to
proceed. In other cases, a prosecutor can reasonably insist upon the defendant’s guilt
despite new evidence to the contrary. Requiring disciplinary agencies to prove factual
innocence, as opposed to focusing on the justification for the prosecutors’ actions, would
require an expenditure of resources equivalent to trying the underlying criminal case.
152 See generally Zacharias, Specificity, supra note 106 (analyzing the issue of specificity
in ethics code drafting).
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might deflect prosecutors from performing their duties impartially, cause them
to “shade” their decisions, and induce a loss of “courage and independence.”153
On the surface, the same concerns seem to apply to professional discipline.154
As a practical matter, applying the vague competence standard in
disciplinary proceedings may make it difficult for prosecutors to defend
judgment calls they have made. Prosecutors implement discretion when dealing
with informants, cooperating witnesses, and police investigators who have
significant incentives to lie or manufacture evidence. Whether and how to use
the evidence depends on the prosecutor’s intuitive assessment of the
individual’s veracity – an assessment that in hindsight might prove unfounded.
The prospect of discipline, and of having to justify their exercise of discretion
in disciplinary hearings, can cause prosecutors to second-guess themselves:
should they routinely disregard potentially questionable evidence,
presumptively disregard it, or leave to juries the task of separating the wheat
from the chaff? More radically, the threat of personal sanctions can, in theory,
cause prosecutors to execute their functions less aggressively across the board.
They might investigate cases less vigorously, prepare witnesses too passively,
or litigate in neutral, non-adversarial ways.
Yet these scenarios cannot confidently be predicted. The opposite conduct
is equally plausible; prosecutors may investigate and prosecute cases just as
aggressively as before, but simply be more mindful of the pitfalls of
questionable evidence. Alternatively, to avoid participating in potentially
disciplinable conduct, prosecutors may leave more matters to the police to
handle, including questioning and preparing cooperating witnesses.
Assessed realistically, the potential for discipline for incompetence is
unlikely to deter prosecutors from performing their functions to the same
degree as the potential for civil liability. Criminal defendants would file fewer
disciplinary complaints than civil complaints because the disciplinary process

153

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423-24 (1976).
Many of the Imbler Court’s concerns about civil liability do not apply equally to the
disciplinary remedy. For example, the Imbler Court feared that the profit incentive inherent
in filing civil lawsuits against prosecutors might result in “unlimited harassment and
embarrassment of the most conscientious [prosecutors].” Id. at 423 (quoting Pearson v.
Reed, 44 P.2d 592, 597 (Cal. 1935)). Disciplinary complaints typically provide no similar
hope of profit. The Imbler Court also suggested that “public trust of the prosecutor’s office
would suffer if [the prosecutor] were constrained in making every decision by the
consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit for damages.” Id. at 424-25.
Fear of professional discipline might constrain prosecutors somewhat, but not nearly as
much as the potential for damages. More importantly, society wants prosecutors to selfregulate to some extent; the Imbler Court specifically recognized professional discipline as a
constraint on prosecutorial conduct and identified the potential for discipline as a positive
factor. Finally, Imbler’s rejection of civil liability for prosecutors was based in part on fear
that jury decision-making would create an undue danger of liability for even honest and
competent prosecutors. Id. at 425-26. Because the disciplinary process does not depend on
juries as fact finders, this concern is not germane here.
154

2009]

THE DUTY TO AVOID WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

41

offers no monetary reward. Non-meritorious complaints can be disposed of more
quickly and with less burden on prosecutors in the disciplinary process.155
Moreover, unlike the aggrieved plaintiffs in civil suits against prosecutors,
disciplinary regulators responsible for instituting investigations under the
competence rule have no cross to bear. The regulators are unlikely to press
prosecutors to perform in an exclusively defendant-friendly way. Like society
more generally, the regulators will want prosecutors to litigate zealously in the
public’s interest.
Finally, the prospect of discipline is unlikely to cause prosecutors to
overemphasize defendants’ interests because countervailing incentives exist.
These include prosecutors’ personal interests in performing their jobs well and
satisfying superiors and the public by obtaining convictions.156
2.

The Risk of Cover Up

Imbler noted that the potential for prosecutorial sanctions may adversely
affect the willingness of prosecutors to assist defendants in post-conviction
proceedings.157 In the Imbler case itself, for example, the prosecutor
volunteered information that enabled the defendant to make a claim that he had
been improperly convicted.158 A prosecutor who anticipates that he or a
colleague will be disciplined upon a finding that a defendant was denied
exculpatory evidence or convicted based on questionable evidence may be less
likely to reveal prior deficiencies in the process. Thus, we find a paradox.
One goal of enforcing competence rules against prosecutors is to encourage
prosecutors to take into account their obligations to help avoid improper
convictions and incarceration. In the post-conviction context, however, the
presence of a disciplinary remedy for prosecutorial negligence may have the
opposite effect on prosecutorial conduct.
This concern, though legitimate, should not be overstated. Prosecutors
know that evidence supporting a claim of prosecutorial negligence can
eventually come out whether or not the prosecutor discloses it.159 Immediate
155

In a civil action, even a frivolous complaint requires a motion before it can be
dismissed. A factually unwarranted complaint may require significant labor to secure its
dismissal. In contrast, disciplinary agencies often dismiss complaints without requiring
any response from the accused lawyer or based solely on the lawyer’s letter response.
156 Imbler suggested, in particular, that a prosecutor might hesitate to go forward in a
close case where an acquittal might trigger a suit for damages. Id. at 426 n.24. A
prosecutor probably would have less reason to fear discipline in such cases because, if they
are truly “close,” a decision in either direction is unlikely to constitute negligence in a
disciplinary sense.
157 Id. at 427 & n.25 (suggesting that prosecutors would have no incentive to aid the
accused because there is a risk that he might be “called upon to respond in damages for his
error or mistaken judgment”).
158 Id. at 412.
159 Indeed, prosecutors’ duty to “confess error” includes revealing new facts that would
correct an earlier error. See Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258 (1942) (referring to
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disclosure by the prosecutor, if he was involved in the initial conviction,
would be a factor in mitigation. Conversely, disciplinary regulators are
likely to deem covering up an error a far more serious offense than negligently
prosecuting originally. A cover up also is likely to reinforce the regulators’
perception that the initial conduct was culpable; it appears to reflect a
consciousness of guilt.
Prosecutors are aware of these countervailing
considerations because the same considerations arise in criminal prosecutions.
C.

By-Products of Discipline

Critics of this Article’s proposal might argue that the need to respond to
frivolous disciplinary inquiries would divert prosecutors from their other
duties.160 Even if enforcing the competence rule would increase the number of
disciplinary complaints, however, responding would not be as burdensome as
responding to unfounded civil claims. Initially, a disciplinary complaint merely
requires an informal written response.161 Disciplinary regulators have broad
discretion to dismiss frivolous claims; unlike in civil cases, they may accept
prosecutors’ justifications as plausible, even when a factual dispute exists in
theory.162 The regulators, most likely, would emphasize cases in which a
judicial decision or media report independently raises questions about a
prosecutor’s conduct.
Critics might also claim that enhancing prosecutorial discipline would
adversely affect the staffing of prosecution offices by making the position
of prosecutor less inviting because of the economic and psychological
consequences of becoming a disciplinary target. Of course, this claim is
speculative. The attractive features of prosecutors’ work may continue to be
more influential.
Finally, there is some possibility that enhancing prosecutorial discipline might
derail broader reform of the criminal justice system. Although prosecutors
contribute to the conviction of innocent defendants, police negligence or
misconduct, inadequate defense representation, and poor judicial oversight are
at least equally responsible. The disciplinary remedy might in some sense make
prosecutors scapegoats and lessen attention to other flaws in the system.

law enforcement officers’ duty to “confess error when . . . a miscarriage of justice may
result from their remaining silent”); United States v. Koubriti, 336 F. Supp. 2d 676, 679
(E.D. Mich. 2004) (referring to a prosecutor’s confession of error as the “legally and
ethically correct decision”); see also Green, Why “Seek Justice”?, supra note 63, at 615
(referring to a state Attorney General’s confession of error and suggesting that a
prosecutor’s role is to do justice, not just convict).
160 See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425 (expressing concern that responding to complaints in civil
lawsuits might divert prosecutors’ “energy and attention . . . from the pressing duty of
enforcing the criminal law”).
161 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 605.6(d)(2) (2008).
162 See, e.g., id. § 605.6(e)(2).
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VI. INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Assuming that the competence rule sets an appropriate substantive standard
for prosecutorial conduct, the question remains whether the standard is best
enforced through the judicially supervised attorney discipline process rather
than some other mechanism, such as internal discipline within prosecution
offices.163 There is no reason to be confident that any American jurisdiction
has an effective internal system for reviewing the conduct of prosecutors who
risk false convictions. The federal Office of Professional Responsibility is not
transparent, making it impossible to determine its efficacy.164 Little is known
about district and county attorney offices’ and state attorney general offices’
internal processes for disciplining prosecutors. Nevertheless, in keeping with
the experimental nature of this Article’s analytic inquiry, one must consider
how enforcing the competence rule through external attorney discipline, in
theory, compares with internal enforcement. Institutional concerns about
external enforcement through disciplinary agencies may prompt or require
procedural limitations on this Article’s proposal that would not be called for in
internal oversight processes.
Section A explores a series of concerns about how vigorous external review
of prosecutorial competence will mesh with, or affect, the ongoing work of
prosecution offices and courts. Section B focuses on the competence of
disciplinary agencies to review prosecutorial decisions. Section C offers
institutional reasons why disciplinary agencies and reviewing courts may hesitate
to regulate prosecutors under the competence rule. Ultimately, the concerns
discussed in this Part suggest problems not simply with invigorating
disciplinary enforcement of the competence rule but also with invigorating
external disciplinary regulation of prosecutors more generally.
A.

Effects of Disciplinary Agency Activities on the Work of Other Institutions
1.

Concerns About Interfering with Criminal Prosecutions

External disciplinary proceedings can interfere with the operation of the
criminal justice system in at least two ways. First, responding to disciplinary
inquiries may require prosecution offices to disclose information that they
legitimately wish to keep confidential. Second, the need to deal with an
external disciplinary agency may interfere with a prosecution office’s
investigation, an individual prosecutor’s discretionary decision-making, and
judicial decision-making in ongoing cases.

163 Bibas, supra note 104 (manuscript at 93) (discussing various internal mechanisms
head prosecutors could use to shape their offices’ work).
164 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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The Threat to Government Confidentiality

The magnitude of the confidentiality problem depends on the nature of the
disciplinary process. Consider a jurisdiction in which disciplinary complaints
and proceedings are public. Suppose, further, that a particular complaint
relates to pretrial conduct in cases that have not yet gone to trial. A
disciplinary inquiry could cause the prosecutor’s office to reveal information
that would hamper its ability to investigate or try the pending or related cases.
Few jurisdictions currently require prosecutors to open their investigative files
to criminal defendants165 and none require prosecutors to reveal information to
persons not yet charged. Making information publicly available through the
disciplinary process would enable suspects to flee, create false defenses, and
find means of undermining the potential evidence against them. Breaching
government confidentiality can also impede prosecutions by endangering
witnesses, revealing informants, or educating targets about the methods the
prosecution office employs.
For purposes of confidentiality, disciplinary inquiries into prosecutorial
competence differ dramatically from inquiries into private lawyers’
competence. Cases against private lawyers typically begin with a client’s
complaint, which waives client confidentiality for purposes of the
proceeding.166 Complaints against prosecutors almost certainly will have a
different source – an aggrieved defendant, a judicial referral, or a proactive
agency inquiry based on a third-party or media report. The government-client
will have a continuing interest in preserving confidentiality with respect
to the information in the prosecutors’ possession.
In cases involving specific rule violations, like the Nifong case, disciplinary
proceedings apparently have not undermined the ability of the
prosecutor’s office to conduct future business. Discipline for general
incompetence presents a far greater risk. For instance, an investigation into
whether a prosecutor intentionally withheld exculpatory material or presented
false testimony focuses on a discrete act, and therefore requires only limited
inquiry into the office’s fact-gathering, strategic decisions, and research. In
contrast, a competence inquiry can be wide-ranging because it turns on a
prosecutor’s entire course of conduct in context.
At a minimum, these concerns warrant care and sensitivity on the part of
disciplinary agencies inquiring into prosecutorial competence. The agencies
might need to adopt special procedures. In jurisdictions where disciplinary

165

Cf. Mosteller, Disbarment of Nifong, supra note 50, at 262-76 (discussing the
origins and development of North Carolina’s open-file discovery rules).
166 See, e.g., Brockway v. State Bar of Cal., 806 P.2d 308, 315 (Cal. 1991) (discussing an
exception to the California attorney-client privilege for “relevant communications between a
client . . . and an attorney charged with professional wrongdoing”); Samuel L. Goodman,
Responding to THAT Letter, 37 RES GESTAE 506, 506 (1994) (“Once your client has filed a
grievance against you, the prohibition against disclosure of a client confidence is waived if
necessary to defend yourself . . . .”).
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proceedings are public, prosecutorial inquiries arguably should be closed. The
timing of disciplinary prosecutions may also have to be controlled so that
proceedings begin only after the completion of the criminal prosecutions from
which they arise.
b.

Interference with Prosecutorial and Judicial Decision-Making

External enforcement of the competence rule can interact with executive
decisions and judicial oversight of the criminal process in problematic ways.
Disciplinary evaluations of prosecutorial conduct while the underlying
cases are still in process may influence or chill prosecutors’ choices about
whether and how to pursue prosecutions. A disciplinary agency’s conclusions
also may pre-judge a court’s assessment of what constitutes unconstitutional
behavior and force the court to consider whether its views need to be
reconciled with the disciplinary ruling.167
Suppose, for example, that a disciplinary agency proceeds with a
complaint that a prosecutor’s participation in incarcerating alleged foreign
terrorists at Guantanamo Bay without trial is incompetent, and potentially
disbarment-worthy, before the courts have an opportunity to decide the
constitutionality of the incarcerations. The possibility of disciplinary sanctions
may cause the prosecutor to arrange for the release of prisoners even if the
release is neither legally required nor the action the Executive Branch should
take. A disciplinary decision can also undermine the authority of the judge
who must ultimately decide the constitutional issues; the disciplinary finding
threatens to reduce public confidence in a subsequent conflicting judicial opinion. In
short, implementing the prosecutorial competence norm through professional
discipline can serve as a backdoor method for creating practice or legal
standards that the code-drafting authorities might not be willing or able to
establish directly through specific professional rules; prosecutorial discipline
can influence ongoing proceedings in a way ethics regulation ordinarily should
not.
These concerns again suggest the need either to look to other means for
enforcing prosecutorial competence, such as internal oversight, or to
implement special procedures for prosecutorial discipline.
In theory,
professional discipline can occur at any time – before a prosecution is
complete, during or after appeals, or subsequent to some event that casts doubt
on a prosecutors’ performance (such as an appellate finding of misconduct or a
determination that a defendant has been wrongfully convicted). Although
investigations into prosecutorial misconduct while it occurs can benefit
aggrieved defendants and usefully deter some prosecutorial misconduct, the

167

See Zacharias & Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation, supra note 110
(manuscript at 2-6) (analyzing the problem of harmonizing code adoption, disciplinary, and
other judicial decisions).
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costs of early external discipline are great.168 These costs may convince
disciplinary agencies to limit investigations to a time after the prosecution
office has exercised its executive discretion and the trial and appellate courts
have had an opportunity to evaluate the individual prosecutor’s conduct.
c.

The Benefits of Internal Oversight

The concerns about interacting with the work of other institutions help
explain why, traditionally, disciplinary agencies have resisted investigating
prosecutorial activities. Disciplinary regulators who assume that prosecutors’
offices employ viable mechanisms for overseeing and ensuring competence
may prefer to risk some prosecutorial misbehavior over the prospect of
undermining effective law enforcement. Internal oversight does not share the
defects, or risks, inherent in the external discipline previously discussed:
government information can remain confidential within the prosecution office;
supervisors can reconcile executive interests with the evaluation of an
individual prosecutor’s competence; and no public decisions that might unduly
influence judicial decision-making need to be issued. As a matter of
institutional choice, therefore, there are reasons to prefer internal methods of
discipline – if these can be made effective.
2.

Concerns About Undermining the Finality of Criminal Proceedings

A paradoxical concern arises from the conclusion that external enforcement
of the competence rule might need to await completion of the underlying
criminal prosecution. Waiting may endanger the finality of criminal cases.
Consider a defendant who accepts a guilty plea but later claims, in a
disciplinary complaint, that the prosecutor negligently withheld evidence of his
innocence. One goal of allowing plea bargaining is to end the process so that
participants in the criminal justice system can focus their resources on other
matters. To the extent that a disciplinary finding of prosecutorial negligence
can prompt a post-conviction review of the plea, discipline may undermine
finality. This would have two consequences: (1) it will encourage disciplinary
complaints; and (2) it may make disciplinary agencies hesitant to find
substance to complaints.
This phenomenon is unavoidable. But it suggests the need for additional
procedural mechanisms to minimize the adverse consequences – procedures that
carry with them the potential to undermine the effectiveness of external
discipline. Because of the risk that disciplinary complaints by convicted
defendants will be tactical, the regulators might justifiably reject some complaints

168 In the Nifong case, for example, the early disciplinary inquiry apparently influenced
Nifong to reconsider his decision to prosecute and helped prevent the trial of falsely accused
suspects. The day after the bar’s Grievance Committee filed a complaint alleging improper
pretrial publicity, Nifong realized that he would have to recuse himself because he had a
conflict of interest. Mosteller, Disbarment of Nifong, supra note 50, at 304-05. Nifong’s
recusal ultimately led to the dismissal of the charges. Id. at 305.
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summarily. To avoid a floodgate of complaints, disciplinary agencies might also
institute a preference for initiating investigations based on factors other than
defendants’ complaints, such as judicial decisions overturning convictions,
decisions identifying procedural wrongs, actual exonerations of defendants, and
media reports documenting improprieties.
Nevertheless, the adoption of disciplinary policies of ignoring (or
minimizing reliance on) defendants’ complaints seems inconsistent with the
objective of preventing wrongful convictions. One might even question
whether prosecutorial discipline would serve any useful function if it builds
mainly upon prior judicial findings. The best justification for continuing
disciplinary enforcement of the competence rule under this scenario is that
sanctions rarely follow judicial findings of prosecutorial misconduct.169 The
potential for professional discipline thus provides some supplemental
deterrence ex ante. More importantly, in the absence of effective internal
oversight, post-proceeding disciplinary inquiries may serve as the only
vehicle to inquire fully into a prosecutor’s behavior, elaborate on the
prosecutor’s standard of care, and sanction improper conduct.
3.

Concerns About Coordinating Disciplinary Decisions with Legislative
and Judicial Standards

One troubling issue that underlies all professional regulation of prosecutors
is magnified in the context of the proposed enforcement of the competence
provision; namely, whether disciplinary regulators have the authority to
impose standards inconsistent with prevailing law. For example, rules of
criminal procedure and constitutional decisions impose discovery
obligations.170 The legal standards balance competing interests in the criminal
justice system; they define what prosecutors must turn over to criminal
defendants, while implicitly suggesting what need not be revealed. When
disciplinary authorities impose sanctions for a prosecutor’s failure to disclose
information that is not required to be disclosed – on the grounds that nondisclosure (together with other conduct) has contributed to a false conviction –
are they overruling the legal standards? If so, is that appropriate?
This issue is not new, nor is it confined to disciplinary oversight of
competence. For instance, many jurisdictions have adopted ethics rules
requiring prosecutorial disclosures that exceed legal requirements. Model Rule
3.8(d) demands disclosure not only of material exculpatory information, but
also of “all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to

169 Judicial findings often do not establish prosecutorial negligence, but simply raise
questions about the prosecutor’s conduct that warrant further inquiry. See Rosen, supra
note 11, at 720-31 (discussing cases in which judicial findings of prosecutors’ failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence have not led to professional discipline).
170 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 20.2-.3, 24.3 (4th
ed. 2004) (setting forth prosecutors’ statutory and constitutional disclosure obligations).
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negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense.”171 Such rules go far
down the path of requiring open-file discovery, a procedure that constitutional
decisions and most states’ criminal procedure rules avoid.172 State supreme
courts ultimately adopt these rules, but local bar drafting committees typically
are responsible for their content.173 One can plausibly argue that ethics
regulation based on these committees’ views of appropriate prosecutorial
conduct or the views of individual disciplinary regulators encroaches on the lawmaking authority of courts and legislators and should not be allowed to trump
external law.
4.

Conclusions

Disciplinary agencies do not operate in a vacuum. Their activities influence
the work of other institutions. This may cause disciplinary regulators to limit
the scope of their activities or to adopt procedures that minimize interference
and help harmonize the standards the various institutions produce.
Narrowly confining disciplinary enforcement of the competence rule in the
ways suggested above arguably robs this Article’s proposal of much of its
remedial force. Yet it makes adoption of the remedy more palatable and
implementation more plausible.
Applying the competence rule more
forcefully, while likely to deter a broader array of prosecutions that risk
wrongful convictions, would maximize the institutional concerns we have
identified.
Significantly, these concerns are common to most forms of external
prosecutorial regulation. Their existence helps explain why disciplinary
agencies have always been reluctant to enforce ethics standards against
prosecutors. It may also explain why code drafters have shied from adopting
broad regulations of prosecutorial performance and, in the absence of intentional
misconduct, have preferred to rely on prosecutorial discretion and self-restraint to
assure reasonable behavior.
If prosecutors’ offices were to develop effective internal disciplinary processes,
such self-restraint on the part of the disciplinary agencies would be fully
justified.174 But for now, the short answer to the institutional concerns is
171 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2008); cf. Leila Atassi, Judges Approve
Open Discovery, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 13, 2008, at B1 (reporting the adoption
of a judicial rule requiring open discovery in Cuyahoga County, Ohio).
172 See Burke, supra note 83, at 61 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s “refusal” to
mandate open-file discovery and urging “voluntary adoption” by prosecutors of open-file
policies as a means of preventing false convictions).
173 These committees typically consist of few prosecutors and a substantial number of
defense attorneys. Cf. Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal
Prosecutors, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 429, 449 n.84 (1996) [hereinafter Zacharias, Who Can
Best Regulate] (discussing the make-up of interest groups within the ABA).
174 Cf. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROSECUTORIAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 1-2,
6-8 (2008), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/rr-pros-official.html (surveying various
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that the choice is enforcement of the competence rule or nothing, because
meaningful self-regulation on the part of federal or state prosecutors’ offices
does not appear to exist. The institutional concerns suggest weaknesses
inherent in the attorney disciplinary process, but these do not justify an entirely
hands-off approach.
B.

The Relative Competence of Disciplinary Regulators

A potentially more compelling objection to implementation of rules like Model
Rule 1.1 is that disciplinary regulators may lack the institutional competence to
evaluate and set standards for prosecutorial conduct. Legal norms governing
prosecutors tend to defer to prosecutorial discretion because effective
prosecutorial decision-making often turns on prosecutors’ intuitive judgments,
informed by experience, regarding the credibility of witnesses and suspects, the
importance of obtaining particular evidence, the likelihood of securing
convictions, and the effectiveness of investigative mechanisms and
interrogation techniques.175 Disciplinary regulators (including disciplinary
counsel and judges who review the decisions of disciplinary counsel) are
unlikely to possess equivalent experience.
There are other reasons to distrust disciplinary regulators when prosecutorial
misconduct is at issue. Most importantly, prosecutorial responsibility for
producing false convictions is a hot button, political issue – one that observers
often approach from liberal or conservative perspectives that can cause them to
pre-judge prosecutorial behavior.176 Disciplinary tribunals thus may evaluate
prosecutorial competence on a subjective or even political basis. Because the
notion of what constitutes justice in prosecutions is debatable,177 defense and
prosecution-oriented examiners will have very different views of reasonable
behavior.
The fact that neutral judges ultimately can review disciplinary decisions
does not alleviate this concern. Courts have their own interests in prosecutorial
regulation. For example, judges have reason to err on the side of deemphasizing disciplinary remedies against prosecutors.
Elected chief
prosecution offices’ practices and recommending improvements in office procedures and
standards for ensuring compliance with discovery obligations).
175 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1984) (positing that charging
discretion is best left to the prosecutor). But see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, The Prosecutor’s
Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 536-37 (1970), reprinted in YALE
KAMISAR ET. AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 913-14 (1980) (arguing that a significant
part of the discretion exercised by American prosecutors is “unnecessary”).
176 Certainly, the bar’s efforts to impose new ethics standards upon prosecutors through
professional rules have been marked by distinct partisanship. See Zacharias, Who Can Best
Regulate, supra note 173, at 449 n.84 (discussing the heated dispute and clash of interests
between the Department of Justice and the defense bar over rules governing
communications with represented persons and subpoenas directed to attorneys).
177 See Zacharias, Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, supra note 35, at 60-64 (discussing
various approaches to defining prosecutorial “justice”).
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prosecutors often are politically powerful, with the ability to exact negative
political consequences upon elected judges who act against the prosecutor’s
office. This may explain judges’ historical reluctance to refer prosecutors
for discipline even after writing an opinion finding misconduct.178
The institutional competence of disciplinary regulators to fashion
prosecutorial standards can be called into question for democratic reasons as well.
Consider the issue of whether a prosecutor ought to be allowed to continue a
prosecution when he honestly believes, as Nifong claimed he did, that a
defendant is guilty but is unsure about his ability to obtain a conviction.179 The
professional codes forbid prosecutors to pursue charges on less than probable
cause,180 ostensibly leaving further analysis to prosecutorial discretion. In theory,
however, the competence rule could apply whenever the prosecutor
“unreasonably” fails to weed out uncertain cases. Should disciplinary
regulators be able to impose a higher standard for prosecutorial screening
through application of the competence provision, in the absence of open
debate?
The academic literature reflects vigorous disagreement about how
convinced of guilt prosecutors should be before bringing or continuing
charges. Some commentators argue that the ethic codes’ probable cause
standard is too low.181 Advocating a standard at the other end of the
spectrum, Professor Bennett Gershman maintains that prosecutors must give
primacy to the state interest in avoiding wrongful convictions by never
bringing charges unless convinced to a moral certainty of the defendant’s
guilt.182 Other commentators have identified intermediate thresholds.183
Proponents of maintaining the probable cause standard suggest that

178 See Williams, supra note 9, at 3477 (arguing for the development of mechanisms to
force judges to report prosecutorial misconduct to disciplinary agencies more frequently).
179 See Mosteller, Disbarment of Nifong, supra note 50, at 1375 (discussing that Nifong
asserted his belief in the defendant’s guilt at his disciplinary hearing, but questioning
whether Nifong’s assertion was credible given the facts Nifong learned as the case
progressed).
180
E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2008).
181
See Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, supra note 52, at 1584 n.53 (“[T]he
‘probable cause’ standard is widely considered too low . . . .”).
182 Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the
Charging Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 522, 530 (1993).
183 See Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, supra note 52, at 1589 (discussing the view
of the ABA Standards and the Department of Justice that a prosecutor “should not try a
defendant unless the prosecutor reasonably believes that there is legally sufficient evidence
for a jury to convict the accused of the crimes charged” and suggesting the further view that
“charges should not be brought unless the prosecutor reasonably believes that the accused is
guilty of the crimes charged” (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 927.220(A) (1997))).
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determining guilt is a function of the jury that prosecutors should not preempt;
the victim is entitled to her day in court.184
The codes’ probable cause standard seems to suggest that the balance
between protecting the innocent and pursuing the guilty is best achieved by
according prosecutors leeway. Allowing disciplinary regulators to secondguess prosecutors would encumber the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and
prosecutorial self-regulation because the threat of sanctions provides an
incentive to err in favor of non-prosecution. Yet, in effectively producing a
higher screening norm, the regulators have no claim to special expertise in
making screening decisions.185 Indeed, given the legitimate arguments for
each of the possible screening standards, one would expect regulators in
different cases to apply the competence rule inconsistently, based on their
individual views of appropriate policy. Arguably, society would be better
served by a single standard set more democratically – by decision makers who
must expose their judgment of how the benefits and risks of vigorous
prosecutions should be balanced to scrutiny, debate, and review.
For these reasons, critics of this Article’s proposal can reasonably suggest that
disciplinary authorities are institutionally incapable of producing neutral, coherent
standards governing prosecutorial incompetence. Prosecutors, in particular,
might believe that internal regulation and discipline is the sole method of
constraining prosecutorial behavior that can adequately account for the
complexities and difficulty of exercising prosecutorial discretion. There are, of
course, responses to this extreme anti-regulatory position – most notably that
internal regulation lacks transparency, tends to be one-sided, and has not
proven effective. Nevertheless, the view that disciplinary regulators lack the
institutional capacity to fairly assess prosecutors’ competence does reflect

184 See Uviller, supra note 122, at 1155-59 (“[W]hen [a prosecutor] is honestly unable to
judge where the truth of the matter lies, I see no flaw in the conduct of the prosecutor who
fairly lays the matter before the judge or jury.”); see also Green & Zacharias, Prosecutorial
Neutrality, supra note 57, at 893 (“If committed to the neutral principle that only the guilty
should be punished, the neutral prosecutor arguably should rely on her view of the
defendant’s innocence. Yet institutional, systemic imperatives militate in favor of leaving
that judgment to the jury.”).
185 Prosecutors must assess defendants’ likely guilt based on intuitions. No one knows
how fallible the trial process is and how likely juries are to convict innocent defendants;
society generally assumes that the reasonable doubt standard minimizes erroneous jury
verdicts, at least when other constitutional and procedural protections also are implemented.
The intuitive nature of the judgment that must be made makes it difficult for disciplinary
regulators, particularly regulators without prosecutorial experience, to assess prosecutorial
competence neutrally. Regulators who have confidence in the trial process may undervalue
the necessity for prosecutorial screening; they may be reluctant to base a standard expressly
on skepticism about the reliability of the trial process. In contrast, regulators who believe
innocent defendants are routinely convicted may expect prosecutors to forgo prosecutions
more readily.
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legitimate concerns, which also help explain the general reluctance of
disciplinary regulators to target prosecutorial misconduct.
C.

Institutional Reasons Why Disciplinary Agencies Might Decline to
Implement the Competence Rule Forcefully

Disciplinary agencies must allocate limited resources.186 When deciding
whether to pursue an inquiry, they take account of such considerations as the
seriousness of the alleged misconduct, the potential difficulties of proof, and
the office resources that will be required to bring the matter to a conclusion.
The traditional selection criteria will militate against routine enforcement of the
competence rule against prosecutors. In addition, disciplinary regulators might
reasonably doubt the effectiveness of pursuing complaints of prosecutorial
incompetence. Political considerations not present in cases against private
practitioners also may heighten disciplinary agencies’ reluctance to proceed.
1.

Enforcement Priorities

In allocating their resources to the most serious cases of apparent
misconduct, disciplinary regulators exercise a sense of proportionality, consider
the targets’ relative culpability, and emphasize the goal of protecting the public
from lawyers who are likely to engage in future misconduct.187 Typically,
disciplinary agencies are most concerned with intentional rule breaking,
dishonesty, or breach of trust;188 these are most likely to harm clients and
reflect potentially recurring characteristics. For similar reasons, the regulators
tend to target lawyers who engage in repeated acts of misconduct.189
Under these criteria, a prosecutor’s single instance of incompetence may
seem relatively insignificant despite the harm it can occasion. An overzealous
prosecutor may not have willfully disregarded ethics requirements or
exhibited a natural propensity to ignore his role. The prosecutor often will not
have been on notice of the disciplinary court’s expectations, making the

186

See Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 11, at 756 (“Disciplinary authorities . . .
must determine how to allocate those [limited] resources so as to punish misconduct most
effectively, deter future misconduct by the miscreant lawyer, protect the lawyer’s clients,
deter misconduct by other lawyers, maintain the image of the bar, and preserve the trust of
potential clients.”).
187 See ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, R. 1.1, 1.2, 3.0, 4.44, 4.54
(1986) (amended 1992); Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s New Clothes and Other Tales
About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 32
(1998).
188 See Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 11, at 757 (“[D]isciplinary
authorities tend to focus on intentional misconduct by lawyers whose actions are selfserving or governed by greed.”).
189 See Levin, supra note 187, at 53-54 (arguing against the practice of relying on a
target’s history of prior disciplinary misconduct in determining whether to proceed with
discipline or impose sanctions).
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prosecutor’s approach more excusable.190 Supervisors and internal procedures
may have even instructed him that the conduct in question was legitimate or
desirable.
That a prosecutor did not commit an obvious or intentional wrong, of
course, is not an automatic defense to disciplinary charges. Private lawyers
have been sanctioned for conduct in the gray zone and for conduct encouraged
by supervisors.191 Nonetheless, a lawyer’s good faith in light of uncertain
standards ordinarily is a factor that regulators take into account in allocating
disciplinary resources.192
The Goldstein case just decided by the Supreme Court illustrates the varying
levels of culpability that can be ascribed to prosecutorial behavior.193 If the
trial prosecutor knew that his chief witness received rewards for serving as an
informant in the past, the prosecutor was clearly obliged to disclose that
fact194 and correct the witness’s false testimony.195 Under this Article’s
proposal, if the prosecutor did not know but negligently failed to seek this
information, the prosecutor might be subject to discipline under the
competence rule.196 Goldstein’s civil rights complaint, however, suggested
that the fault resided primarily in the institutional practices of the prosecutors’
office – namely, the failure to establish mechanisms that would reveal when
witnesses have previously served as informants.197 If Goldstein’s allegation is
correct, it seems unfair to regard the line prosecutor as blameworthy. Neither
ethics rules nor discovery law imposed a clear duty to inquire into the witness’s
background. Disciplinary regulators might reasonably conclude that junior
prosecutors should be able to rely on their offices’ supervision, training, and
institutional practices where no contrary legal requirements are apparent.

190

This Article has previously noted the benefits of its proposal in enabling disciplinary
tribunals to elaborate on prosecutors’ obligations when the rules otherwise fail to do so. See
supra text accompanying note 110.
191 See, e.g., Daniels v. Alander, 844 A.2d 182, 184, 191 (Conn. 2004) (sanctioning an
attorney for failing to correct his partner’s misstatements to the court).
192 At the very least, a lawyer’s good faith may justify truncated proceedings and a
private admonishment.
193 See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
194 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2008) (prohibiting lawyers from
unlawfully concealing “material having potential evidentiary value”); id. R. 3.8(d) (requiring
prosecutors to “make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known
to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused”).
195 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1), (3) (requiring lawyers to correct
false testimony).
196 For example, the prosecutor arguably acted incompetently if he knew that the
informant’s sentence had been reduced and failed to inquire why.
197 Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d sub
nom. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, No. 07-854 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2009).
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Violations may also be difficult and costly to prove. Private attorneys’
incompetence can often be established through pre-existing evidence. For
example, a civil litigator’s failure to file a pleading or raise a particular
legal question will be evident from the trial record. In contrast, questionable
prosecutorial conduct typically is less obvious because the reasonableness of
the prosecutor’s acts or omissions may depend on what the prosecutor knew.
In addition, much of the relevant conduct will have occurred behind the
scenes and been unrecorded.
Disciplinary agencies investigating
prosecutorial conduct cannot expect enthusiastic cooperation from the
prosecutor’s office, which usually has sole control over the information the
regulators seek.198
2.

Empirical Uncertainties: Would the Proposal Work if Instituted?

Disciplinary regulators might doubt that enforcing the competence rule
would achieve its theoretical benefits. The likely effectiveness of enforcement
is at root an empirical issue that can only be resolved by conducting an
experiment. Given the uncertainty, disciplinary agencies may see no reason to
commit resources to implementing the proposal.
For instance, regulators might question whether prosecutors are frequently
negligent, at least in the sense of producing false convictions. Prosecutors,
especially those in large offices, are often well trained and supervised. The legal
system provides checks against wrongful convictions, including an extremely
high burden of proof. No empirical studies demonstrate that prosecutorial
incompetence is prevalent; the evidence of erroneous convictions produced by
prosecutors tends to be anecdotal. Regulators who believe intuitively that
prosecutorial negligence rarely contributes to false convictions can plausibly
conclude that the proposed remedy would do little to protect the innocent.
Moreover, even if regulators assume that prosecutors sometimes contribute
to wrongful outcomes, that does not mean prosecutors need more guidance.
Many prosecutors’ offices have internal rules that go beyond the ethics
requirements or provide prophylactic protections against the misbehavior this
Article addresses.
Some offices, for example, offer relatively open
discovery.199 Others regulate when prosecutors may grant immunity to
witnesses.200 If prosecutorial self-regulation already generates “competence,”

198

This contrasts with disciplinary proceedings against private attorneys. Private
attorneys’ disgruntled clients are typically the source of complaints and will assist
disciplinary investigators by waiving confidentiality and providing documents and eyewitness testimony regarding their attorneys’ acts.
199 E.g., Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield
to New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 541, 593 (“[S]urveys of federal prosecutors have shown
that a significant percentage of them report having an ‘open file’ policy.” (citing H. Lee
Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent? Restrictions on Criminal Discovery
in Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1107 (1991))).
200 E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-23.140 (1997).
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in the sense that term is used here, the proposed disciplinary remedy might be
unnecessary.
Empirical issues such as these, which call into question the usefulness or
viability of the disciplinary remedy, are equally applicable to most forms of
external regulation of prosecutors. They suggest that whenever regulatory
authorities refrain from routinely targeting prosecutors, the regulators may be
acting consciously rather than because of resource-allocation concerns or
neglect. The regulators may simply conclude that the prosecutorial conduct that
commentators bemoan is not as prevalent as the commentators believe or they
may assume that internal remedies are adequate to provide standards and
deterrence.
3.

Political Considerations

Political considerations may increase disciplinary agencies’ reluctance to
enforce the competence rule against prosecutors. By filing charges, an agency
commits itself to doing battle with a powerful institution. In many
jurisdictions, the chief prosecutor is politically influential. Even lower-level
prosecutors sometimes are visible and have contacts in the media. The
regulatory attorneys in charge of disciplinary agencies may realistically fear
that well-funded prosecution offices that can mobilize support will challenge
their enforcement policies in the supervisory courts or in the press. Proceeding
aggressively against prosecutors may risk the regulators’ credibility or
employment, and will in any event enmesh the office in public and private
political battles.201
In the contest over enforcement of rules like the competence provision,
prosecutors control many of the popular arguments. Consider just a few of the
public appeals prosecutors might make: “we do not represent the
defendant”; “we must be free to act as zealous advocates in the adversary
process”; “it is defense counsel’s job, not ours, to protect against wrongful
convictions”; “the reasonable-doubt standard and other procedural advantages
already protect against wrongful convictions”; “prosecutors should not be singled
out for discipline by liberal regulators”; and “the competence rule puts too much
power in the hands of regulators who do not understand prosecutions, will
interfere with investigations, and may ultimately cause prosecutors to refrain
201

As an example of how seriously prosecutors’ offices, as institutions, respond to
disciplinary enforcement policies, consider the Justice Department’s multi-year
campaign to foreclose enforcement proceedings based on rules prohibiting contacts with
represented persons and subpoenaing of attorneys. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, A
Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas of Attorneys, 76 MINN. L. REV.
917, 924-25 (1992) (discussing the no-contacts controversy); Zacharias, Who Can Best
Regulate, supra note 173, at 431-46 (analyzing the Department of Justice’s efforts to
prevent the implementation of, or preempt, ethic rules governing federal prosecutors); Ryan
E. Mick, Note, The Federal Prosecutors Ethics Act: Solution or Revolution?, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1251, 1255-62 (2001) (describing the events and controversy surrounding the refusal
of Department of Justice to abide by states’ no-contact rules).
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from legitimate conduct.” Given the public’s and the media’s tough-on-crime
orientation and general respect for prosecutors, these arguments may be
accepted at face value. Rebutting them will, in any event, consume
considerable time and effort.
There is unlikely to be significant countervailing pressure on disciplinary
agencies to avoid capitulating, save in exceptional cases like Nifong. In the
non-prosecutorial context, incompetent lawyers’ clients sometimes push
disciplinary agencies to institute and maintain proceedings. The regulators
legitimately respond because one function of discipline is to preserve the
public’s trust and confidence in lawyers and professional regulation.
Prosecutors, however, will not ordinarily be the subject of complaints from
their client (i.e., the state). Disciplinary agencies may not regard criminal
defendants as a constituency they need to please or reassure.202
4.

Options

The theoretical benefits of disciplining prosecutors who risk false
convictions compete against disciplinary regulators’ considerable incentives to
forgo or limit inquiries into prosecutorial incompetence. Whether convicted
defendants would treat disciplinary complaints as a viable option for
addressing prosecutorial negligence will depend on a number of factors,
including: (1) when complaints are considered timely (i.e., before or after
judicial findings); (2) whether a disciplinary proceeding can be used as a tool
to obtain otherwise confidential information or to challenge a conviction; and
(3) whether disciplinary agencies develop threshold requirements which
complainants must satisfy before the agencies will institute investigations.
Because most defendants feel aggrieved by their prosecutions, the easier
pursuing a complaint becomes, the greater the risk of a stream of complaints
that would overburden disciplinary agencies and the responding prosecutors.
Faced with routine complaints and significant institutional incentives to
forgo prosecutorial discipline, disciplinary agencies might respond in a variety
of ways. They could investigate all complaints, arguably wasting time and
resources for too little substantive return. More likely, however, the regulators
will find a way to confine enforcement of the competence rule. They might
come to ignore the valid as well as the invalid complaint. Alternatively, they
might implement procedures, such as those suggested above, that limit filings
or investigations.
Such limitations would largely preserve the status quo, in which disciplinary
agencies bring too few actions against prosecutors. Defendants have no

202 The reality is that disciplinary prosecutors may identify with criminal prosecutors.
Both sets of lawyers represent the public in bringing enforcement actions against individuals
who transgress public laws – criminal laws in one case, disciplinary rules in the other. The
psychological implication of enforcing the competence rule strictly against prosecutors is
that disciplinary agencies should enforce the rule strictly against themselves, or else face
charges of hypocrisy.
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financial reasons to complain to disciplinary authorities. Defense lawyers prefer
to avoid making enemies of prosecutors with whom they must deal in the
future. If, in addition, procedures are instituted that prevent disciplinary claims
from benefiting defendants in the criminal process, the natural complainants will
have no incentive to bring prosecutorial incompetence to the discipliners’
attention. The main alternative source for complaints – courts and proactive
investigation by the bar – has proven ineffective under the current regime.203
These observations apply equally to all external prosecutorial discipline. To the
extent that qualified third parties, such as judges and defense counsel, are
unwilling to forward complaints regarding prosecutorial misconduct,
disciplinary agencies face a Hobson’s choice. They can make it easy and
attractive for criminal defendants to institute disciplinary cases, but this
approach will generate frivolous claims and tax the agencies’ resources.
Alternatively, they can introduce artificial limitations on filings.
In theory, internal regulation by prosecutors’ offices would not suffer from
the same failings. Criminal defendants have no strategic incentive to file
meritless complaints with the prosecutor’s office itself. It is conceivable that
an internal process trusted by prosecutors themselves might more readily
attract legitimate complaints from supervisors or colleagues within the office,
judges, and defense counsel. For internal discipline to provide a meaningful
alternative, however, it must be far more transparent than under current
regimes. Prosecution offices would need to persuade aggrieved parties,
potential complainants, and the observing public that their internal oversight is
trustworthy, effective, and targeted to appropriate goals.
CONCLUSION: INHERENT LIMITATIONS ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCIPLINE
The perception that prosecutors are under-regulated leads many
commentators to recommend more rigorous implementation of ethics rules that
target prosecutors. This Article has demonstrated that the problem of false
convictions implicates aspects of prosecutors’ professional conduct that might
plausibly be regulated by the legal ethics codes. The codes have traditionally
focused on promoting the reliability of adjudication and defining the lawyer’s
role in pursuing client objectives. When prosecutors increase the risk of false
convictions, both concerns are implicated. Ordinarily, a lawyer’s zealous
effort to prevail at trial can be assumed to promote the client’s objectives, but
that is not necessarily true for the prosecutor’s client – the “people” or the
state. This client’s objectives include avoiding punishment of, and exonerating,
the innocent.

203

See CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REPORTING MISCONDUCT 3-5 (2007), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/rr-prosofficial.html (analyzing the failure of judges to report prosecutorial misconduct to the bar);
Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 11, at 771-78 (urging more proactive
disciplinary investigations).
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The Article also has illustrated that current ethics rules, as enforced, do not
adequately address prosecutorial behavior that risks faulty convictions. But its
analysis of the options reveals much about the difficulty of developing
regulatory responses to prosecutorial misconduct. The analysis suggests that
there are inherent limitations on what ethics rules and the disciplinary process
can accomplish.
Two possible approaches exist for invigorating discipline against
prosecutors who are catalysts for erroneous convictions. First, ethics regulators
could address discrete aspects of prosecutorial conduct through new rules, the
expansion of existing specific rules, and more rigorous enforcement. But it is
difficult to draft specific rules capturing all risky prosecutorial conduct that, in
hindsight, should be deemed improper. Bright-line rules invite the complaint
that the drafters have implemented requirements more suited to legislation or
procedure rules than ethics provisions, which typically apply to all lawyers and
have an obvious “ethical” dimension.204 Specific rules also tend to be either
under- or over-inclusive.
As an alternative, this Article has proposed employing a general provision,
the competence rule, which disciplinary agencies in theory could interpret in a
fact-sensitive manner to avoid sanctioning legitimate prosecutorial conduct.
The rule provides a basis on which the regulators could pursue the core goal of
encouraging prosecutors to seek just results. But this Article’s analysis reveals
that a host of reasonable objections – ranging from the theoretical, to the
practical, to the political – can be raised in opposition to the enterprise.
Employing the competence rule against prosecutors, like most other
widespread approaches to prosecutorial discipline, may lead to unpredictable
results and chill legitimate prosecutorial behavior. The analysis ultimately
casts doubt not only on the feasibility of vigorous enforcement of the
competence rule but also, more generally, on the viability of professional
discipline as the principle mechanism for regulating the prosecution corps.205
The bottom line is that ethics codes and disciplinary enforcement might
legitimately regulate much of the conduct currently left to prosecutorial
discretion, but professional regulation probably always will be incomplete. This
disappointing conclusion does not rest on any assumptions about the
regulators’ lack of will or even the shortage of resources, but rather is a
consequence of inherent limitations of rule making and discipline. Standing

204

See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate
Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1332-33 (2003)
(examining the argument that rules applicable only to prosecutors “are too likely to reflect
substantive judgments about the criminal process that are within Congress’s exclusive
jurisdiction”); see also Green & Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, supra
note 88, at 390-405 (analyzing the allocation of authority to regulate federal prosecutors, as
between states, federal courts, and prosecutorial agencies themselves).
205 Cf. Mosteller, Duke Lacrosse Case, supra note 49, at 1371-72 (reaching a similar
conclusion based on an examination of the “do justice” standard).
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alone, the disciplinary process will never adequately hold errant prosecutors
accountable for their role in bringing about wrongful convictions.
These conclusions belie the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Imbler that
professional regulation serves as an effective alternative to the civil liability
regime. Although enforcement can be enhanced, discipline will never come
close to playing the lead role in constraining prosecutorial misconduct that the
Court assigns to it. This may mean that the Court should rethink its
prosecutorial immunity doctrines which it extended in the Goldstein case.
More importantly, however, it suggests that more attention must be paid to
alternative mechanisms for guiding and controlling prosecutorial behavior.206
These may encompass formal law adopted by legislatures or informal
approaches, including more robust internal or self-regulation.

206 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 104 (manuscript at 143) (arguing for a greater focus on
“institutional design” and stating that “[t]elling a prosecutor to behave ethically and
consistently is far less fruitful than creating an environment that expects, monitors, and
rewards ethical, consistent behavior”); Meares, supra note 60, at 852-53 (suggesting
creating financial incentives for prosecutorial behavior); Shelby A.D. Moore, Who Is
Keeping the Gate? What Do We Do When Prosecutors Breach the Ethical Responsibilities
They Have Sworn to Uphold?, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 801, 808-10 (2006) (arguing for criminal
prosecution of willful prosecutorial misconduct); Thomas, supra note 83, at 44-45
(recommending that prosecutors and defense attorneys be drawn from the same pool of
specialists); Sonja Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct 1-3
(Univ. of Md. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2008-31, 2008), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1262918 (arguing that sentence reduction should be available
as an option for responding to prosecutorial misconduct).

